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The Application of Self-Affirmation Theory to the Psychology of Climate Change 
Summary 
 
Research has shown that self-affirmation often leads to more adaptive responses to 
messages that focus on behaviour-specific, individual threats. However, little is known 
about the effects of self-affirmation in the context of a multifaceted collective threat, 
such as climate change. In the current thesis I apply self-affirmation theory to the 
psychology of climate change. More specifically, I propose that differentially polarized 
environmental orientations can have an impact on self-affirmation effects. In Chapter 1, 
I provide a general integration of the self-affirmation literature, the literature on 
sceptical responses to climate change, and the findings reported in the current thesis. 
The results from six empirical studies are presented in the following four chapters. In 
Chapter 2, I present findings that indicated that sceptical responses to climate change 
information are not always reduced through self-affirmation, but are instead strongly 
dependent on people’s initial levels of rejection of environmental problems. In Chapter 
3, I suggest that in the absence of a persuasive threatening message, self-affirmation can 
serve to validate a person’s initial worldviews about environmental issues. In line with 
this suggestion, results demonstrated that self-affirmation led to more pro-
environmental motives among participants with positive ecological worldviews but led 
to less pro-environmental motives among participants with negative ecological 
worldviews. In Chapter 4, I examine self-affirmation effects on the acceptance of 
climate change information. Results showed that self-affirmation promoted perceptions 
of greater climate change consequences and more self-efficacy among initially sceptical 
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participants. Additionally, self-affirmation reduced pessimism among less sceptical 
participants. In Chapter 5, I present evidence that showed that self-affirmation resulted 
in more acceptance of information portraying the UK’s contribution to climate change 
problems among participants with high national identification, while group-affirmation 
resulted in more information acceptance among participants with low national 
identification. These effects were only apparent among participants with negative 
ecological worldviews. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
The Application of Self-Affirmation Theory to the 
Psychology of Climate Change: 
An Introductory Overview 
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There is an international consensus among scientists that the accelerated pace in which 
the earth’s climate is warming can largely be attributed to the increase in greenhouse 
gas concentrations generated by human activity, and that this change in climate poses a 
multifaceted threat that can have detrimental consequences for human populations and 
ecosystems worldwide (IPCC, 2007a; Oreskes, 2004). Yet, the growing concern among 
scientists about climate change does not seem to be reflected in the public response to 
information regarding the severity of potential climate change impacts. People tend to 
believe that environmental campaigns are exaggerating the environmental problems that 
we are facing (Whitmarsh, 2011) and that climate change only poses a moderate risk 
that will mainly affect geographically and temporally distant people and places 
(Leiserowitz, 2005). People often try to minimize anthropogenic climate change 
consequences (i.e. climate change consequences caused by human activity) and resist 
information on this topic (Dickinson, 2009; Langford, 2002; Norgaard, 2006). The 
rejection of environmental threats can pose a serious obstacle to stimulating effective 
individual reductions in carbon emissions, as the failure to accept the urgency of the 
need to mitigate climate change consequences can reduce the likelihood that people will 
adopt more pro-environmental behaviours (Gifford, 2011). 
The aim of the present introductory overview is to address the psychological 
obstacles that militate against persuading people of the severity of climate change, using 
self-affirmation theory as a framework. Self-affirmation theory proposes that people are 
motivated to preserve a positive self-image in which the self is perceived as adaptively 
and morally adequate (Steele, 1988). Defensive responses are activated when the self-
image is threatened and function to restore the self-image by distorting the threat. A 
more adaptive way to protect the self-image is to affirm a central, valued aspect of the 
self-concept to re-establish the positive self-image. The boost in self-worth through self-
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affirmation reduces the need to resort to defensive mechanisms and promotes an 
unbiased and open approach to the threat.  
In this introductory overview I argue that in order to reduce the rejection of 
climate change information and to change people’s environmental beliefs, it is essential 
to examine how climate change may present a threat to the self-image and how people 
can be motivated to use adaptive, nondefensive strategies to cope with climate change 
threat. I will first explain how climate change can be seen as a potential threat to the 
self-image, and how affirming self-worth has been shown to eliminate self-threats. I 
then review factors that encourage people to reject the existence of climate change. 
These factors will be integrated with insights from self-affirmation theory to propose 
pathways through which climate change scepticism might be attenuated. As climate 
change poses a collective threat, I will also discuss findings on group-affirmation effects 
in comparison to self-affirmation effects. I will then present ideas for future research 
that have not been covered in the current thesis. Finally, an overview of the empirical 
chapters in this thesis is presented, which is followed by the implications and the 
limitations of the current thesis.   
Climate change as a threat to the self-image 
One of the central tenets of self-affirmation theory is that defensive responses 
can originate in situations where the positive self-image is threatened (Steele, 1988). 
Whereas it has been established that climate change can pose a significant threat to 
human welfare (IPCC, 2007b), it is less clear how one’s regard of the self might be 
threatened by climate change problems. As self-affirmation can provide a buffer against 
threats to the self-image, it is important to clarify which psychological processes related 
to climate change can potentially threaten people’s self-worth. 
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Cognitive dissonance 
People often encounter situations in which they conduct behaviour that 
contradicts their own valued standards by, for example, engaging in acts that may 
potentially harm the well-being of the self or of others. This inconsistency between two 
cognitions can arouse cognitive dissonance, a state of psychological discomfort in 
which people are motivated to reduce the discrepancy that caused the dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957). Reducing the state of dissonance can be accompanied by several 
potentially maladaptive defensive responses, such as a change in attitude, trivializing 
the dissonance, or a rationalization of the act, which are aimed to justify the discrepant 
behaviour (Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995; Stone & Cooper, 2001).  
In relation to climate change, it has been suggested that people can experience 
dissonance due to a discrepancy between their belief that it is important to mitigate 
climate change consequences and the level of their actual engagement in pro-
environmental behaviour. Research has indicated that, in spite of expressing genuine 
concern about both the causes and the consequences of climate change, people have 
developed a range of psychological defensive mechanisms, such as the minimization of 
the individual contribution to the problem, in order to reduce the dissonance aroused by 
the lack of pro-environmental behavioural change in their current lifestyles (Norgaard, 
2006; Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan, & Jaeger, 2001).  
Individual self-image threat 
Whereas the theory of cognitive dissonance suggests that the inconsistency 
between cognitions causes a negative and unpleasant state (Festinger, 1957), self-
affirmation theory posits that it is not the unpleasantness of the inconsistency itself that 
is disturbing to people, but rather how this inconsistency threatens the positive image of 
the self (Steele, 1988; Steele & Liu, 1983). If an individual values the protection of the 
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environment while simultaneously having a high carbon-emission lifestyle, this 
inconsistency may violate one’s personal norms and is thereby likely to threaten the 
individual image of the self as a rational and moral person who does not contribute to 
environmental damage (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001). Alternatively, when people with 
strong sceptical beliefs about the reality of anthropogenic climate change are confronted 
with counterattitudinal evidence regarding the impact of greenhouse gas emissions 
generated by human activity on environmental problems, the information is inconsistent 
with their personal views and might therefore be perceived as a threat to cherished, 
long-held beliefs that are tied to important aspects of the individual identity (Cohen, 
Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). According to self-affirmation 
theory, people do not strive to resolve psychological inconsistencies but instead strive to 
maintain a sense of self-integrity as being “adaptively and morally adequate, that is, as 
competent, good, coherent, unitary, stable, capable of free choice, capable of controlling 
important outcomes, and so on” (Steele, 1988, p. 262). Self-affirmation has been shown 
to reduce psychological discomfort and the need for self-justification in situations that 
evoke dissonance (Matz & Wood, 2005; Steele & Liu, 1983), which demonstrates that 
people are able to tolerate cognitive dissonance if their general self-integrity has been 
boosted by affirming valued aspects of the self.  
Collective self-image threat 
Research has indicated that climate change can also present a threat to the 
collective self-image (i.e. group identities, such as citizenship of a country, or being a 
member of a team). People tend to display defensive biases in favour of their country by 
refusing to accept the national contribution to climate change problems in order to 
protect their collective self-image, as this negative national contribution can challenge 
the perception of their country as being environmentally responsible and egalitarian 
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(Norgaard, 2006). 
Although self-affirmation theory originally focused on reducing defensiveness 
towards individual self-image threats (Steele, 1988), self-affirmation has also been 
applied to threats that concern the collective self-image. Group membership can be an 
important aspect of the self-image and therefore constitutes a valuable source of self-
worth (Cohen & Garcia, 2005; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). Consequently, 
people are motivated to maintain both a positive individual self-image and a positive 
collective self-image, which can cause defensiveness to information that threatens the 
self-image (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). General self-worth can be boosted by affirming a 
valued aspect of the individual self-image, which thereby should make a threat to the 
collective self-image more endurable, as the collective self-image is a part of the self-
definition (Sherman & Cohen, 2006).  
In support of this reasoning, self-affirmation has been shown to lead to 
beneficial effects on defensiveness towards collective self-image threats. For example, 
self-affirmation promoted more openness to counterattitudinal arguments about U.S. 
foreign policy among American participants to whom their national identity was either 
made salient or was central to their general self-definition (Cohen et al., 2007). 
Additionally, it has been shown that affirmed White participants reported greater 
perceptions of racism, rated the average White person as more racist, and reported 
stronger beliefs that White people understate racism than nonaffirmed White 
participants (Adams, Tormala, & O’Brien, 2006). 
The examination of self-image threats in the current thesis 
The four empirical chapters that are included in the current thesis all focused on 
different sources of climate change information. Whereas the information used in 
Chapter 2 focused on statements regarding the discrepancy between the severity of 
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climate change consequences and the lack of individual and collective action 
undertaken to mitigate climate change, Chapter 4 focused on the acceptance of 
(counterattitudinal) information regarding anthropogenic climate change consequences. 
The information that was provided in Chapter 5 focused specifically on the negative 
contribution of UK’s carbon emissions to climate change problems in order to examine 
how self-affirmation can influence responses to collective self-image threat. In Chapter 
3 no information was presented in order to test the effects of self-affirmation in the 
absence of an explicit threat.  
Although it is likely that different aspects of the self-image were threatened 
across the empirical chapters due to the use of different sources of information, the 
current thesis did not explicitly examine how self-perception might be altered through 
different types of climate change information. An assumption in self-affirmation 
literature is that defensive responses are manifested when the positive perception of the 
self-image is threatened, and that self-affirmation can boost self-worth and thus can 
reduce concerns about the implications of the threat to the positive self-image. 
However, little research has empirically examined whether people perceive the 
messages that are commonly used in self-affirmation studies as threatening to the self-
image. Additionally, although self-affirmation has repeatedly been shown to reduce 
defensive responses (Sherman & Cohen, 2006), it remains unclear what drives these 
effects. Future research might therefore examine whether self-perception is influenced 
by potentially threatening information, and which mechanisms underlie self-affirmation 
effects. 
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The rejection of anthropogenic climate change 
There are several factors that can encourage rejection of the notion of 
anthropogenic climate change in order to protect the self-image and that can help to 
justify a lack of engagement with climate change. In this next section these factors that 
can reduce the motivation to commit to pro-environmental actions will be discussed.  
Biased information processing 
Despite the increasing evidence that humans have a substantial impact on 
climate change (IPCC, 2007a), many people tend to respond sceptically to information 
that describes anthropogenic causes of environmental problems (Langford, 2002). 
Conclusions that people draw from a message can be more strongly based on people’s 
prior worldviews than on the actual content of a message (Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, 
Apanovitch, & Lockhart, 1998; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). People are motivated to 
resist information that presents evidence that disconfirms their opinions, as this 
information can have negative implications for their self-image, and tend to scrutinize 
the information in order to search for faults that justify discrediting the evidence (Ditto 
& Lopez, 1992). In contrast, information that supports people’s initial opinions is less 
critically examined and more readily accepted. Moreover, when mixed evidence is 
presented to people with opposing attitudes, they assimilate the information that 
conflicts with their attitudes in a biased manner: Evidence supporting their views is 
perceived to be more reliable and convincing than evidence disconfirming their views 
(Corner, Whitmarsh, & Xenias, 2012; Lord et al., 1979). These biases can restrict the 
potential to learn from information, and it can even have a negative influence on one’s 
personal welfare. For example, when people are confronted with a message about a 
health threat that is personally relevant to them, the parts of a message that are 
perceived to be threatening tend to be more critically evaluated than the reassuring parts 
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of a message, which is likely to result in a rejection of the message (Liberman & 
Chaiken, 1992).  
The defensiveness towards threatening messages can already be detected at an 
early stage of information processing; neuroscientific evidence from event-related brain 
potentials showed that the self-relevance of a threatening health message can evoke 
more efficient attention disengagement (Kessels, Ruiter, & Jansma, 2010). Similarly, 
Klein and Harris (2009) used a visual-dot-probe task as an implicit measure of 
attentional bias, and found that moderately heavy alcohol consumers who were asked to 
read a threatening message about the health-risks of alcohol consumption showed an 
attentional bias away from threatening words in the message. However, when these 
participants were self-affirmed, the effect was reversed; affirmed moderately heavy 
drinkers showed a bias towards the threatening words in the message. Another study 
conducted by Van Koningsbruggen, Das, and Roskos-Ewoldsen (2009) demonstrated 
that a self-affirmation manipulation before a message about health-risks increased the 
accessibility of threat-related cognitions among participants to whom the message was 
relevant. These studies indicate that reducing the concerns about threats to the self-
image through self-affirmation can alter implicit defensive information processing at an 
early stage.  
The biased processing of relevant health-risk messages has repeatedly been 
shown to be reduced by self-affirmation. Compared to nonaffirmed people, affirmed 
people are less defensive and more open to a health-risk message, show greater message 
acceptance, and report more intentions to change their behaviour accordingly (Harris & 
Napper, 2005; Jessop, Simmonds, & Sparks, 2009; Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000). 
Furthermore, resistance to information that contradicts valued beliefs tends to be 
attenuated by self-affirmation, as people become more open to counterarguments and 
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more critical of their own beliefs (Cohen et al., 2000). In relation to climate change, 
self-affirmation can result in greater acceptance of negative anthropogenic climate 
change consequences among people with initially sceptical beliefs about the human 
impact on ecological stability (Van Prooijen & Sparks, 2012; Chapter 4). The 
mechanism underlying this increase in openness to threatening messages appears to 
stem from a stronger ability to objectively evaluate information; self-affirmation can 
lead to stronger sensitivity to the strength of both pro-attitudinal and counterattitudinal 
arguments due to the diminished concerns about how the information may pose a threat 
to the self-image (Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004).  
It should be noted, however, that self-affirmation can also result in less effective 
reasoning strategies in certain situations. The motivation to reject threatening 
information can elicit a strong desire to scrutinize and dismiss the message among 
nonaffirmed people (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Lord et al., 1979). Even though this 
motivated reasoning can lead to a strong bias in information processing, it also enables 
people to detect invalid arguments due to a more effortful analysis of the information 
(Ditto et al., 1998). Self-affirmation has been demonstrated to produce less accurate 
judgements in a context where a sceptical mindset towards the information is beneficial 
(Munro & Stansbury, 2009). Whereas most self-affirmation studies focus on contexts in 
which openness to information is advantageous, relatively little is known about self-
affirmation effects on responses to persuasive but invalid information. As the available 
information in the media often understates the severity of climate change consequences 
(Freudenburg & Muselli, 2010), it is important to explore whether self-affirmation can 
promote more constructive responses to climate change when biased information that 
dismisses anthropogenic evidence is presented.  
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Moreover, little research has examined self-affirmation effects in contexts where 
mixed information containing balanced arguments of equal strength is presented. Due to 
the abundance of available information in the media that ranges from a strong sceptical 
stance towards climate change to a highly alarmist view, it is essential to investigate 
whether self-affirmation can lead to more constructive beliefs about climate change 
when people are exposed to information that consists of a mixture of pro- and anti-
anthropogenic climate change arguments. In a situation where no climate change 
information was presented to challenge people’s views, self-affirmation resulted in a 
polarization of initial environmental beliefs, which indicates that self-affirmation may 
encourage people to trust their previously formed opinions in a nonpersuasive context 
(Van Prooijen, Sparks, & Jessop, in press; Chapter 3). However, if people become more 
open to counterattitudinal arguments and more critical of their own views by affirming 
the self before a message is presented (Correll et al., 2004), information that focuses on 
mixed evidence may potentially lead to more neutral opinions about climate change.  
The moderating effect of environmental beliefs.  
The personal importance of beliefs is a strong determinant of biased information 
processing. People are motivated to defend beliefs that are important to the self-image 
by, for example, resisting information that presents counterattitudinal evidence (Ditto & 
Lopez, 1992; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992; Lord et al., 1979; Steele, 1988). However, 
beliefs that are of low importance to the self are less likely to elicit defensiveness, as 
contradictory evidence to these beliefs will have few implications for judgements of 
self-worth. In line with this reasoning, self-affirmation has been shown to be most 
effective in reducing defensiveness in response to threatening information among 
people to whom the information is of high personal importance (Harris & Napper, 2005; 
Reed & Aspinwall, 1998). For example, Correll et al. (2004) demonstrated that 
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affirming the self-image promoted increased sensitivity to the strength of both 
proattitudinal and counterattitudinal arguments and decreased biased information 
processing only among participants who considered the issue that was raised in the 
information as personally important.   
Climate change is a well-covered topic in the media, and has provoked many 
public debates between people with opposing views (Freudenburg & Muselli, 2010). 
Consequently, most people in the western world are regularly confronted with 
information about climate change, and have formed environmental beliefs that can 
potentially affect the processing of climate change information (Van Prooijen & Sparks, 
2012; Chapter 2). In this thesis I therefore suggest that environmental beliefs are likely 
to moderate self-affirmation effects in a climate change context. In support of this 
suggestion, my results showed that self-affirmation enhanced the acceptance of the 
severity of climate change consequences after reading climate change information 
among people who were sceptical about the human impact on climate change, while 
self-affirmation reduced pessimism about climate change information among people 
with less sceptical environmental beliefs (Van Prooijen & Sparks, 2012; Chapter 4). 
These findings are consistent with previous research that showed that self-affirmation 
increased concern about a potentially threatening issue among highly defensive people, 
whereas self-affirmation reduced concern among people who were low in defensiveness 
(Griffin & Harris, 2011). Furthermore, another study has demonstrated that in the 
absence of potentially threatening climate change information, self-affirmation 
accentuates prior ecological worldviews among people with more polarized views (Van 
Prooijen et al., in press; Chapter 3). Taken together, these findings consistently show 
that self-affirmation effects are mainly effective among people who have relatively 
strong environmental beliefs. It is likely that these more polarized beliefs, regardless of 
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whether these beliefs are sceptical in nature or are supportive of the human impact on 
climate change, reflect greater personal importance of environmental problems and 
greater issue involvement, which in turn can lead to arousal of dissonance and a 
stronger perceived threat to the self-image (Aronson, 1999). For example, people who 
value their sceptical environmental beliefs may feel threatened by anthropogenic 
climate change information as it presents a counterattitudinal perspective. It is therefore 
important to consider people’s prior environmental beliefs when assessing the impact of 
self-affirmation on the resistance to information about climate change.  
Origins of climate change scepticism.  
In the current thesis it is demonstrated that prior ecological worldviews and 
(more specific) environmental beliefs moderate self-affirmation effects in a climate 
change context. Whereas results have indicated that self-affirmation can reduce the 
rejection of counterattitudinal information about climate change among people with 
initially sceptical beliefs (Van Prooijen & Sparks, 2012; Chapter 4) and people with 
negative ecological worldviews (Chapter 5), the current thesis does not explicitly 
examine where these environmental beliefs stem from, which could provide more 
insights into the reasons why people might perceive counterattitudinal climate change 
information as a threat to the positive self-image.  
One of the determinants of sceptical environmental beliefs is political 
orientation, in which more conservative political views are associated with scepticism 
about the reality of climate change, rejection of anthropogenic climate change 
information, and lower endorsement of pro-environmental values (Dunlap, Xiao, & 
McCright, 2001; Hamilton, 2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a; Poortinga, Spence, 
Whitmarsh, Capstick, & Pidgeon, 2011; Whitmarsh, 2011). Pursuing the mitigation of 
climate change can potentially threaten the ideology and the capitalistic interests of the 
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Conservative movement (McCright & Dunlap, 2003), as environmental policies to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions can lead to governmental restrictions and can require 
significant changes in industrial organizations in terms of, for example, the use of fossil 
fuels (IPCC, 2007a). In addition, pro-environmental actions are often not compatible 
with the affluent lifestyle that can result from industrial capitalism (Gifford, 2011; 
McCright & Dunlap, 2003). People with conservative political views are therefore 
likely to be motivated to protect these core elements of the Conservative movement by 
challenging the validity of environmental concerns regarding climate change 
consequences (McCright, 2011; McCright & Dunlap, 2011b).  
It has been argued, however, that the effect of political conservatism on 
scepticism about climate change can be explained in part by system justification 
motives–the tendency to perceive the social system and the status quo as legitimate in 
order to maintain a sense of stability and certainty (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). The desire 
to justify the status quo is stronger among people with conservative political views in 
comparison to people with liberal political views (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). 
System justification has been shown to partially account for the effect of political 
orientation on scepticism about climate change, and is associated with stronger rejection 
of environmental problems that challenge the current social and economic system 
(Feygina, Jost, & Goldsmith, 2010). Although the current thesis has specifically focused 
on the moderating effect of environmental beliefs (Chapter 2 and Chapter 4) and 
broader ecological worldviews (Chapter 3 and Chapter 5) on the impact of self-
affirmation on responses to climate change, it is worthwhile for future research to 
explore whether the impact of political orientation and system justification on 
scepticism about climate change can be attenuated through self-affirmation.  
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Expectations of climate change consequences 
Whereas scientists anticipate that humanity will face severe climate change 
consequences (IPCC, 2007a; Oreskes, 2004), it appears that the general public has 
relatively low expectations about climate change impacts, which in turn can undermine 
pro-environmental motives. One reason for these relatively low risk expectations is the 
level of uncertainty that accompanies climate change (Gifford, 2011). Despite the 
growing scientific consensus about the human impact on climate change (Oreskes, 
2004), it is unavoidable that scientists have a degree of uncertainty about climate change 
models as probability terms are used to determine the likelihood of specific outcomes. 
However, research has shown that probability terms that are presented by the IPCC are 
incorrectly interpreted by the public and lead to higher perceived levels of imprecision 
of IPCC findings than is intended (Budescu, Broomell, & Por, 2009). This uncertainty 
surrounding climate change can function as a reason for not participating in pro-
environmental actions and can increase rejection of the severity of climate change 
(Norgaard, 2006). Furthermore, uncertainty in resource dilemmas has been shown to 
promote behaviour focused on self-interest that leads to resource depletion and to 
enhanced optimism regarding the future outcomes of the resource size (Jager, Janssen, 
& Vlek, 2002; Joireman, Posey, Truelove, & Parks, 2009). This, in turn, can have 
detrimental effects on environmental problems, as the uncertainty that is associated with 
climate change can consequently lead to depletion rather than conservation of limited 
natural resources (Hine & Gifford, 1996).  
In relation to uncertainty, the optimism that people tend to have about their own 
personal risk of experiencing negative outcomes compared to the risk of others might be 
another reason why climate change consequences are often underestimated (Kunda, 
1987; Weinstein, 1980). For example, Pahl, Harris, Todd and Rutter (2005) have 
24 
demonstrated that this comparative optimism - which has been defined as “a belief that 
one is less likely to experience negative events and more likely to experience positive 
events than are other people” (Shepperd, Carroll, Grace, & Terry, 2002, p.65)- is 
displayed for a wide range of environmental risks and is not limited to people who are 
not involved in pro-environmental behaviour, but is also found among environmental 
activists. Furthermore, people tend to perceive problems that are relatively proximate as 
less severe than problems that are more distant on a spatial and temporal level (Gifford 
et al., 2009). The optimistic view that one is unlikely to be personally affected by 
climate change may reduce the perceived urgency of taking mitigating action against 
environmental problems.  
Self-affirmation has been shown to be effective in promoting the acceptance of 
health-related risk information (Harris & Napper, 2005; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; 
Sherman et al., 2000). However, in this thesis I present findings that illustrate that these 
effects of self-affirmation in the health domain can be generalized to the environmental 
domain: When participants read information describing the severity of global climate 
change consequences, self-affirmation increased the acknowledgement of these dangers 
among participants with initially sceptical beliefs. Moreover, while the information 
presented focused solely on potential general global consequences, thereby maintaining 
uncertainty about consequences in more specific locations, self-affirmation also 
enhanced a generalization of the information to more proximal consequences of climate 
change that were not explicitly targeted by the information (Van Prooijen & Sparks, 
2012; Chapter 4). These findings thereby suggest that both the optimism about the risk 
of being personally confronted with climate change and the rejection of the severity of 
climate change due to uncertainty regarding the occurrence of negative climate change 
outcomes can be attenuated through self-affirmation. Both obstacles might provide 
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strategies to protect the self-image by minimizing the risks attached to climate change, 
and the need to apply these strategies appears to be reduced when the self-worth is 
affirmed. 
Group-affirmation and defensiveness towards collective threats 
Climate change represents a global, collective threat that is difficult to influence 
at an individual level, and individual behaviour to mitigate climate change 
consequences is often perceived to be ineffective by the public (O’Connor, Bord, & 
Fisher, 1998). The most effective actions to mitigate climate change consequences 
require an international cooperation between multiple groups and nations (IPCC, 2007a; 
Stern, 2006). However, the responsibility for a collective problem can be diffused due 
to the fact that multiple groups are involved, which in turn can enhance intergroup 
biases (Gifford, 2008; Johnson & Levin, 2009). Research has demonstrated that citizens 
tend to display defensive biases in favour of their country by refusing to acknowledge 
the harmful national contribution to climate change problems and by justifying 
substantial national greenhouse gas emissions through, for example, shifting the blame 
of climate change to the greenhouse gas emission levels of other countries (Norgaard, 
2006).   
Although self-affirmation can enhance the acceptance of threatening information 
about a group with which one identifies (Adams et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2007), 
research has recently started to examine whether an affirmation of the collective self-
image (i.e. group-affirmation) can also reduce defensiveness towards collective threats. 
For example, group-affirmation has shown to be more effective in reducing group-
serving attribution biases than self-affirmation among fans who highly identified with 
the basketball team that they supported, while self-affirmation was more effective in 
attenuating defensiveness than group-affirmation among low identified fans (Sherman, 
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Kinias, Major, Kim, & Prenovost, 2007). It was argued that, as the group is more central 
to the self-definition for people who highly identify with their group, the group provides 
a better affirmation resource for highly identified group members than for low identified 
group members. 
In the current thesis (Chapter 5), the effects of group-affirmation were compared 
with the effects of self-affirmation among UK citizens on the need to justify the harmful 
greenhouse gas emissions of the UK and the consequences that these emissions can 
have on developing countries. Results showed that self-affirmation led to a lower need 
to justify UK greenhouse gas emissions than did group-affirmation among highly 
identified UK citizens with sceptical environmental beliefs; in comparison to group-
affirmation, self-affirmation promoted less attribution of blame for climate change to 
other countries, less rejection of climate change consequences on developing countries, 
and stronger moral judgment about pro-environmental behaviour. In contrast to 
previous findings (Derks, Scheepers, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2011; Derks, Van Laar, & 
Ellemers, 2009, Sherman et al., 2007), my findings indicate that participants who highly 
identified with the threatened group benefitted more from a self-affirmation than from a 
group-affirmation. This discrepancy in findings can potentially be explained by the 
nature of the targeted threat.  
Whereas previous literature on the effects of identification and group-
affirmation on defensive responses towards collective threats have focused on collective 
threats to group-performance, my study focused on a collective threat that is associated 
with group-morality. As climate change is strongly influenced by human greenhouse 
gas emissions of developed countries and is likely to have severe effects on nations that 
hardly contribute to climate change (IPCC, 2007b), climate change can be perceived to 
be an ethical issue (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006). Moreover, as the consequences of 
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climate change can be attributed to our own harmful behaviour, it can pose a threat to 
moral values that are an important aspect of our positive self-image. Information about 
anthropogenic climate change can therefore increase feelings of guilt, which in turn can 
enhance the motivation to shift the responsibility to others in order to maintain the 
positive self-image (Rothschild, Landau, Sullivan, & Keefer, 2012). I suggest that 
threats to the morality of the group with which one identifies might be more difficult to 
cope with than threats to the performance of the group. By affirming the collective self, 
the self-relevance of the collective threat to group morality may increase among people 
who perceive the group to be an important part of their self-definition, which in turn 
may promote stronger group biases than the affirmation of the individual self.              
In addition, I found that self-affirmation promoted higher perceived collective 
efficacy with regard to reducing climate change consequences than did group-
affirmation among highly identified UK citizens with sceptical environmental beliefs. 
This finding can have positive implications for the motivation to reduce individual 
carbon emissions, as perceived collective efficacy to change climate change outcomes 
has shown to be an important determinant of pro-environmental behaviour (Homburg & 
Stolberg, 2006). Overall, these findings indicate that, despite the collective nature of the 
threat that climate change represents, affirming the individual self-image appears to 
promote more willingness to accept the national contribution to climate change 
problems than does affirming the collective self-image.   
Future directions 
In the current introductory overview I have described how climate change can 
evoke biased responses, how self-affirmation can reduce resistance to information 
presenting evidence of anthropogenic climate change, how the findings of this thesis 
can be integrated with the previous literature, and suggested directions for future 
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research. However, there are several other aspects of climate change responses and self-
affirmation theory that are worth exploring in subsequent studies, but that have not been 
covered in the current thesis. In the following section additional avenues for future 
research will be introduced. I will discuss which values have been associated with pro-
environmental behaviour, and how affirming specific values may influence the effects 
of self-affirmation on responses to climate change. I will also discuss through which 
processes perceptions of climate change risk are formed, how these processes can create 
barriers to motivate people to change their behaviour, and whether self-affirmation can 
potentially influence these processes. Then, research that focused on the effects of self-
affirmation on behaviour change will be reviewed.    
The affirmation of values   
Values represent self-imposed principles that vary in importance, and can reflect 
desirable broad goals that one is motivated to obtain and that transcend context and time 
(Schwartz, 1992). Personally endorsed values can shape beliefs and guide consequent 
behaviour (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Gärling, 1999; Stern, 2000). In relation to pro-
environmental behaviour, research has demonstrated that when people endorse self-
enhancement values (i.e. values related to the enhancement of personal success), they 
were less likely to behave in a pro-environmentally friendly manner, whereas people 
with stronger pro-social values were more determined to conduct pro-environmental 
behaviour (De Groot & Steg, 2010). However, it is important to note that pursuing 
certain values can result in consequences that conflict with other endorsed values that 
express opposite motives. For example, self-transcendence values (i.e. prosocial values 
related to egalitarianism and concern for the welfare of others) that promote pro-
environmental behaviour can in certain contexts be incompatible with values that are 
related to self-enhancement (Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung, & Rees, 2009). When people 
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strive to obtain personal successes, it often stimulates behaviour that can increase 
carbon footprints, such as driving a big car or conspicuous luxury consumption 
behaviour (Gifford, 2011). As perceived self-competence has a strong influence on 
people’s self-evaluation (Wojciszke, 2005), it is likely that many people who value the 
environment may also engage in some form of behaviour that is discrepant with these 
pro-environmental values, which implies that the discrepancy between pro-
environmental values and high carbon-emission behaviours might result in defensive 
responses towards climate change information.   
In the self-affirmation literature, the most widely used technique to affirm 
people is to provide a short list of values, from which participants are asked to select the 
value that is most important to them and to write a few sentences to describe why this 
value is important to them. In this context, a range of different values have been used in 
self-affirmation manipulations under the assumption that these different values all serve 
to lead to the same goal of bolstering a sense of self-integrity (McQueen & Klein, 
2006). However, research has demonstrated that the value that is affirmed can influence 
the subsequent effects in responses. For example, when people were asked to complete 
a threatening serial subtraction task, the affirmation of intrinsic values (i.e. core 
personal values) resulted in less self-handicapping and better task performance than did 
the affirmation of extrinsic values (i.e. values related to other-determined standards; 
Schimel, Arndt, Banko, & Cook, 2004). In relation to climate change, when American 
undergraduate participants were confronted with information in which young 
Americans were identified as the main contributors to climate change, participants 
showed lower tendencies to blame international corporations for climate change when 
their moral value was affirmed than when their personal control was affirmed. In 
contrast, when the presented information stated that it has not yet been determined what 
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the main cause of climate change is, the affirmation of personal control resulted in a 
lower tendency to blame international corporations for climate change than did an 
affirmation of moral value (Rothschild et al., 2012). The effectiveness of the self-
affirmation manipulation was therefore dependent on the aspect of the self-concept that 
was threatened by the climate change information; self-affirmation provided an adaptive 
strategy to restore the self-concept if the self-affirmation was focused on the specific 
aspect of self-perception that was threatened, which then prevented the need to resort to 
the less adaptive strategy of scapegoating international corporations.  
Additionally, there is evidence suggesting that the affirmation of certain values 
can lead to backfire-effects, in which self-affirmation increases rather than decreases 
biased responses and resistance to change (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Several studies 
have shown that dissonance or defensiveness can increase when self-affirmations are in 
a domain related to the self-threat (Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995; Sivanathan, 
Molden, Galinsky, & Ku, 2008). A relevant affirmation can highlight the personal 
standard that was violated, which enhances the need for self-justification. For example, 
Blanton, Cooper, Skurnik, and Aronson (1997) asked participants to write a counter-
attitudinal essay which advocated a cut in funding for services for handicapped students. 
Participants were reaffirmed by providing bogus personality feedback on either their 
creativity (unrelated affirmation) or on their compassion (related affirmation). The most 
favourable attitude toward cutting the funding was found in participants who received a 
relevant affirmation, which suggests that the focus on dissonance that was evoked by 
the affirmation triggered a self-justifying attitude change.  
It should be considered that most of these studies have presented the threatening 
information before the self-affirmation manipulation was introduced (e.g., Aronson et 
al., 1995; Blanton et al., 1997; Rothschild et al., 2012). Critcher, Dunning, and Armor 
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(2010) have argued that self-affirmation manipulations are only effective if they are 
introduced before the initiation of a defensive response. If the self-image is restored by 
a defensive response to the threat, a subsequent self-affirmation manipulation is 
unlikely to be effective, as the threat to the self has already been alleviated through the 
defensive process. It is therefore important to also investigate the effects of affirming 
different values prior to a threat. Within the priming literature, writing about reasons 
why the value of equality has personal importance has been shown to lead to egalitarian 
behaviour, whereas writing about the value of helpfulness increased helpful behaviour 
(Maio, Olson, Allen, & Bernard, 2001). As priming a set of values does not only 
promote value-congruent behaviour but also decreases value-incongruent behaviour 
(Maio et al., 2009), it is merited to examine whether the affirmation of specific values 
can activate motivations that enhance biased responses. In line with this reasoning, 
Lehmiller, Law, and Tormala (2010) found that affirming values about relationships 
with family and friends can increase the endorsement of traditional family values, which 
in turn was positively associated with prejudice towards homosexuality. It was 
suggested that these traditional family values tend to conflict with expressing tolerance 
of homosexuality, and the affirmation of values about relationships with family and 
friends can therefore undermine the reduction of prejudiced biases.  
The suggestion that the affirmation of different values prior to a threat can 
promote different responses raises the issue whether certain self-affirmation effects are 
the result of priming values rather than affirming self-integrity. It has been shown that 
both implicit self-affirming primes and a standard self-affirmation manipulation led to 
better performance following academic threat and reduced defensive biases towards 
threatening health-risks (Sherman et al., 2009), thereby indicating that typical self-
affirmation effects can also occur through priming tasks. Exploring the circumstances in 
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which priming effects and self-affirmation effects are fundamentally different is an 
interesting avenue for future research. The value-scale self-affirmation manipulation is 
commonly used in self-affirmation literature and often includes a list of values adapted 
from Allport, Vernon, and Lindzey (1960), which contains values that are related to 
economics, science, aesthetics, social life, politics, and religion (McQueen & Klein, 
2006). The preference to use the list of values from Allport et al. (1960) stems from the 
necessity to create a context where it is unlikely that the presented threat is consonant 
with the value orientation and which therefore avoids priming effects (Steele & Liu, 
1983). It should be noted, however, that the values ‘social life’ and ‘religion’ tend to be 
rated as most important by the majority of participants (e.g. Crocker, Niiya, & 
Mischkowski, 2008), which in turn have both been categorized as values that are related 
to self-transcendence across cultures (Schwartz, 1992). It can therefore be argued that 
the values used in many self-affirmation manipulations might not be neutral. More 
research is needed to clarify these issues.      
Affective versus analytical evaluation of risk 
Perceptions of risk are formed as a result of both affective and analytical 
processes (Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996). Affective processes stem from an 
evolutionary need to respond rapidly to immediate dangers in our direct surroundings 
and can evoke emotional reactions such as fear, whereas the slower analytical processes 
are based on a cognitive evaluation of the more objective features of risk (e.g. the 
probability of experiencing specific outcomes). Although both types of processes can 
influence risk perceptions, it has been suggested that risk perceptions are more 
prominently driven by affective processes than by analytical processes. According to the 
risk as feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), emotional 
responses to risk can be evoked without being mediated by analytical processes, while 
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emotional responses do mediate the effect of analytical processes on risk-related 
behaviour. In situations where the affective response to risk diverges from the analytical 
response, the resulting risk-related behaviour is often determined by the affective 
response, even though people are aware that the chosen course of action might not be 
rational. For example, people can experience strong irrational phobic reactions to highly 
unlikely events and show avoidance behaviour accordingly, while events that are more 
likely to occur do not elicit fear (Barlow, 1988). It is therefore important that people 
have a negative emotional response to a dangerous situation in order to motivate them 
to take action that can reduce the risk (Peters & Slovic, 2000).  
An important determinant of fear responses to risk is the vividness of the mental 
representation of the threatening outcomes through, for example, personal experience 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001; Weinstein, 1989). It is uncommon, however, for people to 
personally experience a rare negative event resulting from climate change. The 
perceptions of the risk that climate change poses are more likely to be based on 
analytical processes than on affective processes, as most people learn about the 
probability of specific climate change-related outcomes from a statistical summary 
rather than from personal, more emotional experiences. Due to the low probability that 
people have been exposed to climate change-related events, the threat of climate change 
does not elicit strong fear responses, which in turn results in lower levels of concern 
than the objective probability of events would warrant (Weber, 2006). Even when 
people are personally exposed to climate change consequences, it does not necessarily 
increase their perceived risk of climate change. Research has indicated that people who 
were victims of flooding - which is considered to be one of the main threats that climate 
change can cause (IPCC, 2007b) - showed comparable responses to climate change as 
people who were not personally exposed to climate change consequences (Whitmarsh, 
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2008). Although the flooding in itself was considered to be a serious personal risk, it 
was perceived as a separate issue from climate change; the changing pattern of the 
weather was only considered to have an indirect contribution to the flooding.   
Additionally, the abstract nature of climate change consequences also 
contributes to lower perceptions of risk of and limited fear responses to climate change. 
Research has indicated that events that are likely to occur in the distant future are 
construed in abstract terms that lack emotional involvement, while events that are 
proximate in time are construed in concrete terms that elicit strong affective associations 
(Trope & Liberman, 2003). As climate change represents a potential danger in the 
distant future for most people, the severity of climate change outcomes is unlikely to 
lead to strong feelings of concern (Weber, 2006). The abstract construal of climate 
change thereby mainly appears to lead to an analytical evaluation of climate change 
risks, while the affective evaluation of climate change risks should be reduced, as 
climate change is less likely to be construed in concrete, more emotional terms. 
Although the emotional response to risk is an important factor in motivating 
people to take precautionary action (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Peters & Slovic, 2000), 
an intense emotional response to risk can also be maladaptive (O’Neill & Nicholson-
Cole, 2009; Ruiter, Abraham, & Kok, 2001). Feelings of helplessness and denial can 
increase in situations where people experience strong anxiety about a potential threat 
and feel unable to influence the expected outcome (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). These 
adverse effects of affective processing can be reduced through self-affirmation. 
Research has shown that affirming the self-worth can increase perceived efficacy to 
cope with threats (Epton & Harris, 2008; Harris, Mayle, Mabbott, & Napper, 2007), 
enhance positive affect (Koole, Smeets, Van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999) and 
attenuate psychological and physiological stress responses (Creswell et al., 2005; 
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Sherman, Bunyan, Creswell, & Jaremka, 2009). Moreover, it has been demonstrated 
that self-affirmation promotes the processing of information on a more abstract 
construal level (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Wakslak & Trope, 2009), which suggests 
that self-affirmation might reduce defensiveness towards threatening information by 
enhancing the ability to focus on central, core aspects of events; this structured way of 
thinking would help individuals to see the big picture and would produce a clearer, 
more structured view of the self.  Furthermore, self-affirmation has been shown to 
increase self-transcendence and positive other-directed feelings, thereby inducing a state 
of openness to self-improvement (Crocker et al., 2008). These findings indicate that 
self-affirmation may change the perspective that people have about threatening issues 
by raising awareness that a constructive and open mindset towards these issues is more 
important than is the distortion of temporary threats to the self-image.  
Whereas self-affirmation has been shown to be successful in enhancing 
analytical processing of risks (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Wakslak & Trope, 2009) and 
attenuating anxiety about risks (Creswell et al., 2005; Sherman et al., 2009), more 
research is warranted to examine how promoting greater acceptance of threatening 
messages through analytical pathways may influence emotional involvement in risk 
perception. As perceptions of climate change are mainly driven by analytical processes 
(Weber, 2006), while risk-related behaviour is mainly driven by affective processes 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001), it is important to determine whether self-affirmation results 
in an adaptive level of negative affective responses to climate change risks, whether 
self-affirmation primarily increases analytical processing of climate change information, 
or whether self-affirmation has beneficial effects on both types of processing. When 
people completed a self-affirmation manipulation before reading information regarding 
a health-related risk that was personally relevant to them, self-affirmation increased 
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negative affect about the risk among highly defensive people, while negative affect was 
decreased among nondefensive people, thereby indicating that self-affirmation may lead 
to more optimal and adaptive affective responses to risk (Griffin & Harris, 2011). 
Furthermore, research has indicated that maladaptive responses to climate change that 
have been suggested to stem from affective processes are reduced through self-
affirmation; self-affirmation has been demonstrated to increase perceived self-efficacy 
with regard to mitigating climate change consequences (Van Prooijen & Sparks, 2012; 
Chapter 4) and to reduce the minimization of self-involvement in climate change 
(Sparks, Jessop, Chapman, & Holmes, 2010).  
However, although the belief in the ability to influence threatening outcomes is 
essential to stimulate precautionary action  (Homburg & Stolberg, 2006; Stern, 2000), 
no constructive effects of self-affirmation on pro-environmental intentions to adapt 
behaviour have been found among people with more sceptical environmental beliefs 
(Van Prooijen et al., in press; Chapter 3). For example, despite promoting greater 
acceptance of counterattitudinal climate change information, self-affirmation did not 
increase the acceptance of the personal implications of climate change with regard to 
adjusting behaviour to reduce carbon footprint (Van Prooijen & Sparks, 2012; Chapter 
4). One potential explanation for these findings might be that self-affirmation motivates 
people to process climate change information at an abstract construal level, thereby 
increasing the cognitive perceptions of climate change risk, but does not necessarily 
enhance the affective processing of climate change risk information. This may lead to a 
discrepancy between the cognitive evaluation and the emotional evaluation of climate 
change risks, which, according to the risk as feelings hypothesis, can consequently lead 
to responses that are dominated by the emotional risk evaluation rather than the 
cognitive evaluation (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Future research could compare the 
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effects of self-affirmation on both analytical and affective processing to investigate how 
they may influence pro-environmental intentions. Alternatively, it could be examined 
whether a visual, more vivid presentation of climate change consequences rather than 
describing these consequences in a message after completing a self-affirmation 
manipulation could stimulate affective processing.    
Self-affirmation effects on behavioural change 
In order to avoid severe disruption to society over the coming few decades, it is 
essential that people take action to mitigate climate change consequences (IPCC, 2007a; 
Stern, 2006). Although the reported research in this thesis has provided insights on the 
effects of self-affirmation on responses towards climate change, I did not examine 
whether these effects translate to adopting actual pro-environmental behaviour to reduce 
individual carbon emissions. However, there is evidence that self-affirmation can affect 
subsequent behaviour. In the health-risk domain, affirmed people have been shown to 
be more likely to engage in behaviour that reflects intentions to take precautionary 
action than nonaffirmed people after reading threatening information about relevant 
health-risks, such as requesting a sample of sunscreen (Jessop et al., 2009), completing 
an online diabetes-risk test (Van Koningsbruggen & Das, 2009), and the purchasing of 
condoms (Sherman et al., 2000). Furthermore, self-affirmation can lead to longer lasting 
effects on actual health-behaviour; Epton and Harris (2008) have found a significant 
increase in the consumption of fruit and vegetables over a 7-day period following an 
experimental self-affirmation manipulation. Behavioural effects of self-affirmation have 
also been found in other domains; self-affirmation can produce beneficial effects on 
performance among negatively stereotyped people (Cohen, Garcia, Apfel, & Master, 
2006; Cohen, Garcia, Purdie-Vaughns, Apfel, & Brzustoski, 2009). For example, Cook, 
Purdie-Vaughns, Garcia, and Cohen (2012) conducted a longitudinal study that 
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demonstrated that African American adolescents often experienced a reduced sense of 
belonging during middle school, which in turn negatively affected performance. 
However, self-affirmation stabilized a sense of belonging and increased performance 
over a 2 year period.  
A key determinant of behavioural change is the strength of the intention to adapt 
ones behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Despite the positive effect of self-affirmation on the 
acceptance of anthropogenic climate change information (Van Prooijen & Sparks, 2012; 
Chapter 4), I did not find evidence in the reported research of this thesis that people 
with sceptical environmental beliefs had greater intentions to reduce their carbon 
emissions after being affirmed. Whereas I focused on intentions to conduct more pro-
environmentally friendly behaviour in general, future research might target more 
specific behaviours and include information on how to achieve the behavioural change. 
It is possible that affirmed people are willing to adopt pro-environmental behaviour, but 
either do not know how to apply the behavioural change or believe that the intention to 
generally reduce individual carbon emissions will substantially affect their lifestyle 
(Kaplan, 2000). In line with this last argument, I found that in the absence of persuasive 
threatening climate change information, affirmed participants with sceptical 
environmental beliefs reported higher perceived required effort to reduce carbon 
footprint than did their nonaffirmed counterparts (Van Prooijen et al., in press; Chapter 
3). By focusing on one specific behaviour, the assumption that adopting pro-
environmentally friendly behaviour will entail significant sacrifice of a satisfying 
lifestyle might be reduced, which in turn could produce beneficial effects of self-
affirmation on intentions to change behaviour. However, it should be considered that 
adopting one specific pro-environmental action does not necessarily increase the 
motivation to adopt other pro-environmental behaviours (Thøgersen & Crompton, 2009; 
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Thøgersen & Ölander, 2003). Future research could examine whether potential effects 
of self-affirmation on pro-environmental intentions and subsequent behaviour are 
limited to the targeted pro-environmental behaviour in the information, or whether these 
effects are transferred to other behaviours.    
The current thesis 
Overview  
In the current introductory overview I have placed a strong emphasis on the 
psychology of defensive responses towards climate change, while using the self-
affirmation theory as a framework. However, to avoid a high level of overlap between 
the introductory overview and the empirical chapters that follow, the empirical chapters 
focus more strongly on self-affirmation theory and its application to climate change 
threat. Although many studies have demonstrated that self-affirmation can have 
beneficial effects on defensiveness towards various threats (see Sherman & Cohen, 
2006), few studies have examined whether affirming self-worth can induce more 
openness to climate change, which presents a multifaceted, collective threat that is 
relatively intangible and uncertain for most people. Whereas it has been established how 
climate change can represent a severe threat to human welfare (IPCC, 2007b), it is not 
clear how climate change may pose a threat to the positive image of the self. The main 
objectives of the current thesis were to examine whether self-image concerns can evoke 
resistance towards climate change, and whether self-affirmation can promote more 
adaptive and open responses to climate change information. Furthermore, I tried to 
establish how differentially polarized environmental beliefs may influence self-
affirmation effects. The studies reported in this thesis are presented in their 
chronological order .  
 In Chapter 2 I present three studies addressing self-affirmation effects on 
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sceptical responses to climate change information. The studies were built on previous 
research, which demonstrated that affirmed people reported lower levels of climate 
change scepticism after reading climate change information than did nonaffirmed 
people (Sparks et al., 2010). In contrast to previous findings, however, Study 1 showed 
that affirmed participants reported higher levels of scepticism about climate change than 
did nonaffirmed participants. The purpose of Study 2 was to explain this discrepancy in 
findings by including prior levels of rejection of environmental problems as a 
moderator. In Study 3 a similar design as in Study 2 was used, but the self-affirmation 
manipulation was adapted. Yet, in both latter studies no effects of self-affirmation on 
scepticism towards climate change information were found. Prior levels of rejection of 
environmental problems did predict climate change scepticism in either study: Higher 
levels of rejection were associated with more climate change scepticism. 
As the studies conducted in Chapter 2 showed that initial environmental beliefs 
were a strong indicator of the acceptance of climate change information, I was 
interested in examining the effects of self-affirmation on initial environmental beliefs 
when no persuasive threatening information about climate change was introduced to 
challenge these established opinions. I thereby also extended the self-affirmation 
literature, as most studies tend to use a persuasive threatening message to test self-
affirmation effects. Findings showed that self-affirmation resulted in more pro-
environmental motives among participants with positive ecological worldviews but led 
to less pro-environmental motives among participants with negative ecological 
worldviews. These findings suggest that in the absence of a persuasive threatening 
message, self-affirmation might serve to validate a person’s initial worldviews about 
environmental issues. 
In Chapter 4, I examined whether self-affirmation might increase the acceptance 
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of information about potential climate change consequences. Research has indicated 
that, despite the various severe global problems they can involve, climate change 
consequences are often underestimated (Leiserowitz, 2005; Weber, 2006). Although 
self-affirmation has been shown to lead to greater acceptance of health-related risk 
information (Harris & Napper, 2005; Sherman et al., 2000), little is known about self-
affirmation effects on the acceptance of information that focuses on a multifaceted 
collective threat that is climate change. My findings demonstrated that, among initially 
sceptical participants, self-affirmation increased risk perceptions of global and national 
climate change consequences and promoted stronger beliefs that personal efforts to 
reduce climate change consequences can be effective. Among less sceptical participants, 
self-affirmation reduced pessimism about the climate change information. 
Whereas Chapter 4 provides novel insights into the effects of self-affirmation on 
the acceptance of the risks of a collective threat, Chapter 5 builds on the literature 
suggesting that group-affirmation can be a more effective strategy than self-affirmation 
to reduce defensiveness towards collective threats among people who highly identify 
with the group that is threatened (Derks et al., 2011; Derks et al., 2009; Sherman et al., 
2007). However, while these studies focused on defensive biases towards collective 
performance-related threats, my study focused on a collective threat to group morality, 
as climate change is often perceived to be a moral issue (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006). 
Results showed that self-affirmation promoted more acceptance of the contribution of 
the UK to climate change problems than did group-affirmation among participants with 
high national identification and negative ecological worldviews. These findings indicate 
that it might be important to distinguish whether a collective threat is related to morality 
or competence characteristics of the ingroup in order to predict the effectiveness of 
group-affirmation in comparison to self-affirmation among highly identified group 
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members.    
Implications 
Prior environmental beliefs have been shown to lead to biases in the processing 
of climate change information, in which the information tends to be interpreted in the 
context of existing beliefs (Corner et al., 2012; Whitmarsh, 2011). Yet, little research 
has explored whether these biased responses to climate change information can be 
attenuated. In contrast, self-affirmation research has repeatedly demonstrated that 
defensive responses to potentially threatening information can be reduced by reflecting 
on important values (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). However, self-affirmation theory has 
rarely been applied to climate change, which presents a unique and multifaceted threat 
to the lives and livelihoods of countless people in present and future generations (IPCC, 
2007b). The research in the current thesis provides a novel approach to both fields of 
research, as it is the first to examine how previous environmental beliefs are influenced 
by self-affirmation manipulations. Results showed that self-affirmation can decrease the 
impact of prior environmental beliefs on the processing of climate change information, 
which resulted in greater message acceptance among people who were initially sceptical 
towards the information (Van Prooijen & Sparks, 2012; Chapter 4; Chapter 5). It is 
important to note, however, that in the absence of explicit information about climate 
change, self-affirmation led to an accentuation of prior environmental beliefs (Van 
Prooijen et al., in press; Chapter 3). These findings suggest that self-affirmation 
promotes more open-mindedness in situations where prior beliefs are challenged by 
explicit information.     
The implications of the findings in the current thesis for communication about 
climate change are twofold. First, campaigns promoting the necessity of reducing 
carbon footprints might benefit from exploring the options to include self-affirmation 
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interventions in these campaigns in order to reduce the rejection of  the presented 
information. The rejection of information about climate change can diminish the 
willingness to address environmental problems and therefore constitutes a barrier to 
behavioural change (Gifford, 2011; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007; 
O’Connor, Bord, & Fisher, 1999). Findings in the current thesis indicate that a self-
affirmation manipulation prior to the presentation of climate change information can 
increase pro-environmental motives and perceptions of both self- and group-efficacy 
with regard to mitigating climate change consequences (Van Prooijen & Sparks, 2012; 
Chapter 4; Chapter 5), which are determinants of behaviour (Ajzen, 1991; Homburg & 
Stolberg, 2006). Research has recently started to focus on the impact of brief self-
affirmation manipulations, which might be more suitable for implementation in 
practical interventions than the standard self-affirmation manipulations. Results showed 
that a brief self-affirmation manipulation was equally effective as the standard self-
affirmation manipulation (Armitage, Harris, & Arden, 2011).   
Second, it is important to raise awareness that information about climate change 
can unintentionally present a threat to the positive self-image, which in turn can result in 
sceptical responses to environmental campaigns. The current thesis shows that reducing 
self-image concerns through affirming the self can attenuate maladaptive responses to 
anthropogenic climate change information. Effectiveness of environmental campaigns 
might be enhanced by examining whether information that focuses on the benefits of a 
pro-environmental lifestyle rather than on the negative consequences of current 
lifestyles can prevent the occurrence of the rejection of climate change information.  
Limitations 
The current thesis has several limitations that need to be addressed. One 
potential limitation is that the values that were used to affirm participants in the current 
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thesis were primarily self-transcendence values (Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4). It 
can therefore be argued that the effects that were found in the current thesis emerged 
due to priming self-transcendence aspects of the identity rather than self-affirmation. 
However, some of the results that were reported in the current thesis suggest that this 
alternative explanation is unlikely. First, in the absence of threatening persuasive 
information, affirming self-transcendence values resulted in less pro-environmental 
motives among participants with negative ecological worldviews (Van Prooijen et al., in 
press; Chapter 3). Self-transcendence values have repeatedly been associated with 
stronger pro-environmental motives (De Groot & Steg, 2010; Evans et al., 2012; 
Gärling, 1999). Priming self-transcendence values is therefore likely to enhance pro-
environmental motives, which contradicts the suggestion that priming effects can 
explain these findings. Second, the self-affirmation manipulation used in Chapter 5 
focused on self-enhancement qualities rather than self-transcendence qualities (Čehajić-
Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011). The affirmation of self-
enhancement qualities, which was less relevant to the presented information about 
climate change, resulted in effects that were congruent with the effects found when self-
transcendence values were affirmed. Nevertheless, it is important for future research to 
examine whether the affirmation of different values can lead to different outcomes.  
In the current thesis the underlying processes that may determine the effects of 
self-affirmation were not explicitly examined. Self-affirmation literature has suggested 
potential mediators that might clarify what drives self-affirmation effects, such as other-
directed feelings (Crocker et al., 2008). However, although the inclusion of mediator 
measures could provide interesting insights into the underlying processes of self-
affirmation, I made the careful decision not to measure potential mediators in order to 
avoid direct effects of mediator measurement on the outcome variables. The 
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measurement of a potential mediating process in itself can interfere with the effect of 
interest, such that mediator measurement can either induce or prevent the process from 
occurring (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). Additionally, only the first study that is 
reported in the current thesis (Chapter 2) included manipulation checks, while the self-
affirmation manipulations used in the remaining studies were not checked. It has been 
argued that the inclusion of manipulation checks may unintentionally affirm self-
integrity, which would thereby contaminate the participants in the control condition 
(McQueen & Klein, 2006). Results of Study 1 (Chapter 2) showed that the inclusion of 
the selected manipulation check measures, in which self-feelings, mood, and self-
perceived level of kindness were assessed, were not sufficient to self-affirm participants 
in the control condition. Yet, the self-affirmation manipulation also did not yield 
significant effects on the selected manipulation check measures, which indicates that the 
selected manipulation check measures could not explain which mechanisms may 
underlie self-affirmation effects. Furthermore, whereas the selected manipulation check 
measures in Study 1 (Chapter 2) did not contaminate participants in the control 
condition, it cannot be assumed that other forms of manipulation check measures will 
also not unintentionally self-affirm participants in the control condition.  
Another limitation of the current thesis that needs to be acknowledged is that the 
samples used in all studies consisted exclusively of students, which is a common 
problem within many psychology studies due to, for example, practical constraints in 
terms of resources. Additionally, participants were sequentially assigned to the 
experimental conditions in all studies reported in the current thesis. Random allocation 
of the participants would have served as a better safeguard against potential biases in the 
distribution of participants over the experimental conditions.    
Most of the measures used in the current thesis were not counterbalanced in 
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order to avoid the development of item-wording factors within the measures 
(Schriesheim & Eisenbach, 1995). However, this also reduced the control over 
unwanted effects such as practice responses. Furthermore, no behavioural measures 
were included in the current thesis. The potential effects of self-affirmation on pro-
environmental actions presents an important direction to pursue for future research.  
Finally, no statistical power analyses were conducted. It is likely that Study 2 
and Study 3 (Chapter 2) were low in power due to relatively small sample sizes, which 
might explain the lack of significant effects of the self-affirmation manipulation within 
these studies. A power analysis would have provided insights into whether the 
conducted statistical tests had an adequate sensitivity to detect existing effects, which 
may have clarified if no self-affirmation effects were found due to the low power in the 
studies, or if the self-affirmation manipulation was ineffective. 
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Although awareness about climate change is relatively high amongst the general public 
in the United Kingdom, many people are still ambivalent about the causes and the 
severity of climate change (Downing & Ballantyne, 2007). The problem of climate 
change is often minimized, and the tendency to reject information on this topic is quite 
common (Dickinson, 2009). This rejection, which might partially stem from feelings of 
anxiety and insecurity that are evoked by the threat of climate change (Koole & Van 
den Berg, 2005; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, 
& Solomon, 1999), can not only prevent people from protecting the environment but it 
can ultimately even lead to an increase in materialism, consumerism, and other 
behaviours that can be detrimental to the environment (Kasser & Sheldon, 2000; 
Sheldon & Kasser, 2008). Thus, it is important to learn how to overcome these initial 
responses to threatening environmental information in order to increase the awareness 
of the severity of climate change problems.  
In this research I investigated whether self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) can 
be a helpful tool in attenuating scepticism about the reality of climate change. Steele 
proposed that people strive to maintain a positive image of the self as being “adaptively 
and morally adequate” (p. 262). When this image is threatened, people can respond 
defensively by, for example, downplaying or avoiding the threatening information in 
order to reduce the threat. However, self-affirmation theory predicts that the effect of 
these self-threats can be eliminated by affirming a valued aspect of the self-identity, 
which reconstructs a positive global image of the self. The threat to global self-integrity 
should then be lowered and therefore be more tolerable, which should reduce the need 
to respond defensively to threatening information. 
Ever since Steele proposed his self-affirmation theory (1988), much research has 
reported beneficial effects of self-affirmation in terms of reducing biased processing of 
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threatening information. For instance, Cohen, Aronson, and Steele (2000) examined 
self-affirmation effects on responses to information that contained disconfirming 
evidence about cherished beliefs. Participants were proponents and opponents of capital 
punishment, who were asked to read counterattitudinal information regarding the death 
penalty. Findings revealed that affirmed participants responded more favourably to the 
counterattitudinal information and were more likely adapt their attitudes accordingly 
than nonaffirmed participants.  
Another example of attenuating defensiveness towards threatening information 
through self-affirmation was reported by Sherman, Nelson, and Steele (2000), who 
examined defensive responses to information regarding risk of developing breast 
cancer. Women (coffee-drinkers vs. non-coffee-drinkers) were given an article that 
described research that linked caffeine intake to fibrocystic disease, a precursor to breast 
cancer. Within the nonaffirmed control condition, coffee-drinking women were more 
resistant to the information than non-coffee-drinking women. These results support 
earlier findings that the personal relevance of threatening information is an important 
determinant of the rejection of such information (Liberman & Chaiken, 1992). 
However, findings also showed that the self-affirmation manipulation reversed these 
responses. Not only did affirmed coffee-drinking women report more acceptance of the 
information than did nonaffirmed coffee-drinking women, the affirmed coffee-drinking 
women were also more accepting of the information than were affirmed non-coffee-
drinking women.  
Self affirmation theory has been applied successfully to a range of domains that 
address attitude and behavioural change, and has been shown, for example, to promote 
health-related behaviours (e.g. Harris & Napper, 2005; Jessop, Simmonds, & Sparks, 
2009; Sherman et al., 2000), and to reduce prejudice (Fein & Spencer, 1997). However, 
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self-affirmation theory has rarely been applied to the domain of pro-environmental 
attitudes. Research that has shown promising results on this topic was reported by 
Sparks, Jessop, Chapman, and Holmes (2010). In their first study participants completed 
a kindness-affirmation task (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998) and were asked to read a 
threatening message about climate change. The self-affirmation manipulation resulted in 
a decrease in both general scepticism about climate change and the minimization of 
self-involvement in environmental outcomes.  
Overview 
The current research expands on the studies conducted by Sparks et al. (2010) 
by examining whether self-affirmation can attenuate scepticism about the reality of 
climate change, and how previous levels of rejection of environmental problems may 
moderate these effects. Three studies were conducted. In Study 1, I set out to replicate 
and extend the findings of Sparks et al. by assessing the effects of a kindness-
affirmation on scepticism about climate change and commitment to protect the 
environment. The aim of Study 2 was to address whether prior beliefs regarding the 
rejection of environmental problems can moderate kindness-affirmation effects on 
scepticism about climate change and message derogation. In Study 3 it was examined 
whether the results of Study 1 and 2 could be replicated using a different self-
affirmation manipulation. A value-affirmation manipulation was used, in which 
participants were asked to write a short statement about a value that was important to 
them.  
Study 1 
The aims of Study 1 were threefold. First, I aimed to replicate the findings of 
Sparks et al. (2010), which showed that a kindness-affirmation reduced climate change 
scepticism. In the current study the effects of a kindness-affirmation on scepticism 
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about climate change were assessed using an established measure of climate change 
scepticism developed by Whitmarsh (2011). Second, I assessed whether a kindness-
affirmation could influence commitment to protect the environment. Whereas lower 
levels of scepticism about climate change may indicate more general acceptance of 
climate change information, it does not inform us about how perceptions of the personal 
implications of climate change are shaped by such information. Assessing commitment 
to protect the environment allows us to investigate if the personal implications of the 
climate change information are accepted. Third, I examined whether the inclusion of 
manipulation checks would affect the responses on other outcome measures. Most self-
affirmation studies have not included manipulation checks because this procedure might 
cause an unintended affirmation among the nonaffirmed control group (McQueen & 
Klein, 2006). In Study 1 half of the participants completed manipulation checks in order 
to explore whether these contamination effects actually occur, and how a kindness-
affirmation may influence self-feelings, mood, and self-perceived levels of kindness. I 
expected that a kindness-affirmation would promote less scepticism about climate 
change and more commitment to the environment. 
Method 
Participants. Eighty (61 female; 19 male) students from a UK university took 
part in the study for either course credit or a monetary reward. The age of the 
participants ranged from 18 years to 65 years (M =  22.05, SD = 6.13). 
Design and procedure. The hypotheses were tested in a 2 (kindness-
affirmation: affirmation vs. control) by 2 (manipulation checks: manipulation checks 
included vs. manipulation checks excluded) design. University students were recruited 
in various areas at campus, and asked if they were willing to fill in a questionnaire. 
Participants were sequentially assigned to one of the four conditions. 
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Materials. 
Kindness-affirmation manipulation. The participants started with a short 
checklist that was claimed, depending on the affirmation condition, to measure the level 
of kindness towards others, or personal opinions. The affirmation condition was based 
on the self-affirmation manipulation of Reed and Aspinwall (1998), which presented the 
participants with 10 items that focused on relatively small and common acts of kindness 
(“Have you ever been concerned with the happiness of another person?”; “Have you 
ever tried not to hurt the feelings of another person?” (Yes/ No). Participants were 
requested to give an example for each item. It was expected that most participants 
would be able to agree with all the items in the checklist, which in turn would serve as 
an affirmation. In the control condition, participants completed 10 items that were 
unrelated to kindness and instead focused on general opinions (“I think that chocolate is 
the best flavour for ice cream”; “I think that winter is the most satisfying season during 
the year” (Yes/ No). Participants were asked to provide a reason for their opinions.    
Climate change information. After the completion of the checklist, a leaflet was 
presented to the participants that contained information about climate change. The 
information consisted of six short paragraphs of quoted passages taken from different 
media sources and books (Sparks et al., 2010). An example of a passage is: ‘So asking 
wealthy people in the rich nations to act to prevent climate change means asking them 
to give up many of the things they value - their high performance cars, their flights to 
Tuscany and Thailand and Florida - for the benefit of other people… The problem is 
compounded by the fact that the connection between cause and effect seems so 
improbable. By turning on the lights, filling the kettle, taking the children to school, 
driving to the shops, we are condemning other people to death. We never choose to do 
this. We do not see ourselves as killers. We perform these acts without passion or intent 
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(Monbiot, 2006)’. Each paragraph was followed by a question about the text in order to 
check that participants had read the information thoroughly.  
Manipulation checks. When participants finished reading the climate change 
information the experimental manipulation was checked. Single item measures (adapted 
from Sherman et al., 2000) assessed self-feelings (“How do you feel about yourself 
right now?”, extremely negative [1] to extremely positive [7]), mood (“How would you 
describe your mood right now?”, extremely bad mood [1] to extremely good mood [7]), 
and self-perceived level of kindness (”How kind do you consider yourself to be?”, not 
at all kind [1] to extremely kind [9]).  
The participants in the ‘manipulation checks excluded’ condition completed the 
dependent measures directly after they finished reading the climate change information.  
All dependent measures items were assessed on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Climate change scepticism. The thirteen-item climate change scepticism scale 
developed by Whitmarsh (2011) was used to measure scepticism about climate change 
(e.g., “Claims that human activities are changing the climate are exaggerated”, α = .93).  
Commitment. A six-item measure was developed to assess commitment to 
protect the environment (“I feel a strong commitment to being environmentally 
conscious”; α = .88).  
Results 
Manipulation checks. A MANOVA revealed that there was no significant effect 
of kindness-affirmation on the manipulation checks, F (4, 35) = .18, p = .95. There was 
a general pattern that participants in the affirmation condition were more negative than 
participants in the control condition (see Table 1).  
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All dependent measures were subjected to a 2 (kindness-affirmation: affirmation 
vs. control) by 2 (manipulation checks: manipulation checks included vs. manipulation 
checks excluded) ANOVA.  
Climate change scepticism. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
kindness-affirmation on scepticism about climate change, F (1,76) = 4.63, p = .03, 
partial η2 = .06. In contrast to my hypothesis, participants in the affirmation condition 
were more sceptical about climate change (M = 3.44, SD = 1.24) than participants in the 
control condition (M = 2.86, SD = 1.14). No main effect of manipulation checks on 
scepticism about climate change was found, F (1,76) = .62, p = .44, partial η2 = .008, 
nor did manipulation checks interact with kindness-affirmation, F (1,76) = .07, p = .79, 
partial η2 = .001.  
Commitment. There was no significant difference in reported commitment to 
protect the environment between participants in the affirmation condition (M = 4.67, SD 
= 1.24) and participants in the control condition (M = 5.09, SD = 1.20), F (1,76) = 2.30, 
p = .14, partial η2 = .03. Manipulation checks did not have a main effect on 
commitment, F (1,76) = .30, p = .59, partial η2 = .004, nor did manipulation checks 
interact with kindness-affirmation, F (1,76) = .41, p = .53, partial η2 = .005. 
Discussion 
In the study conducted by Sparks et al. (2010) it was found that a kindness-
affirmation reduced climate change scepticism. In contrast to my hypothesis, the results 
of Study 1 revealed that a kindness-affirmation significantly increased scepticism about 
climate change. This finding suggests that affirming the self-concept might lead to 
backfire-effects on scepticism towards environmental problems (i.e. an increase rather 
than a decrease in defensiveness towards potentially threatening information; see 
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Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Self-affirmation did not significantly influence commitment 
to protect the environment.  
Furthermore, in Study 1 I examined whether the inclusion of manipulation 
checks could confound self-affirmation effects on the outcome measures by causing an 
unintended affirmation in the control condition (McQueen & Klein, 2006). The 
inclusion of manipulation checks did not contaminate the effects of the kindness-
affirmation manipulation on scepticism about climate change or commitment to protect 
the environment, which indicates that asking participants about their self-feelings, 
mood, and self-perceived levels of kindness with single items was not sufficient to 
affirm self-worth. Additionally, whereas Sherman et al. (2000) found that self-
affirmation led to more positive self-feelings but did not affect mood, the current study 
showed no significant effects of kindness-affirmation on any of the manipulation 
checks. It should be noted, however, that participants in the study of Sherman et al. 
completed the affirmation manipulation (and the subsequent manipulation checks) after 
reading threatening information, while in the current study participants completed the 
affirmation manipulation before reading the climate change information, and the 
manipulation checks were assessed after the information was presented. The potential 
effects of the affirmation manipulation on self-feelings, mood, and self-perceived levels 
of kindness may therefore have been altered by the content of the information that was 
read in this Study. I suspect that the discrepancy between the positive self-feelings that 
may have been evoked by the affirmation manipulation and the negative content of the 
information could have eliminated any effect on the manipulation checks. 
Study 2 
Contrary to common findings in self-affirmation literature that show a reduction 
in defensiveness towards threatening information through self-affirmation (Cohen et al., 
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2000; Sherman et al., 2000; Sparks et al., 2010), the results of Study 1 showed an 
opposite effect where kindness-affirmation increased scepticism about climate change. 
In Study 2 I sought to explain this difference in effects by exploring whether prior levels 
of rejection of environmental problems can moderate the impact of kindness-affirmation 
on responses to climate change information. A measure of message derogation was 
included as an additional indicator of scepticism towards the climate change 
information. Affirmed people have been shown to be more open to counterattitudinal 
arguments while being more critical of arguments supporting proattitudinal views 
(Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004). It might be that affirmed people with low levels of 
rejection of environmental problems will be less persuaded by the climate change 
information due to a more critical examination of the presented proattitudinal 
arguments. The climate change information that was provided to participants in Study 1 
and in the study conducted by Sparks et al. (2010) focused on the personal opinions 
about climate change of politicians and writers rather than on scientific facts, which is 
therefore likely to be perceived as less objective and reliable. These weaker arguments 
could in turn result in stronger scepticism about climate change and more message 
derogation among affirmed people with low levels of rejection of environmental 
problems. In contrast, affirmed people with high levels of rejection of environmental 
problems may be more open to the counterattitudinal arguments presented in the 
information, which may result in a reduction in scepticism about climate change and 
less message derogation.   
However, it may be argued that the kindness-affirmation manipulation used in 
Study 1 is in a domain related to the threat that the information may present. The 
relevance of the kindness-affirmation to the self-threat might highlight a personal 
standard that was violated, which has previously been shown to enhance defensiveness 
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and the need for self-justification (Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995; Blanton, Cooper, 
Skurnik, & Aronson, 1997; Sivanathan, Molden, Galinsky, & Ku, 2008). Climate 
change information that describes both the detrimental impact of climate change on 
humanity and how the lack of pro-environmental behaviour increases the severity of 
these consequences may be more threatening to people who tend to reject environmental 
problems, who might be less engaged in pro-environmental behaviour in their daily life 
than people who do not reject environmental problems. They may therefore experience 
stronger dissonance when reading this information after completing a kindness-
affirmation than do people with low levels of rejection of environmental problems, 
which in turn may lead to a backfire-effect of the kindness-affirmation. Based on this 
explanation it can alternatively be hypothesized that kindness-affirmation will lead to 
more scepticism about climate change among people with high levels of rejection of 
environmental problems, while it will lead to less scepticism about climate change 
among people with low levels of rejection of environmental problems.  
Method 
Participants. Forty-five (40 female; 5 male) students from a UK university took 
part in the study in return for course credit. The age of the participants ranged from 17 
years to 24 years (M =  18.89, SD = 1.70). 
Design and procedure. One week after the rejection of environmental problems 
measure was administered, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire that 
contained the kindness-affirmation manipulation, the climate change information, and 
the outcome measures. Both parts of the study could be completed either using a paper 
and pencil questionnaire or online. Participants were sequentially assigned to the 
affirmation or to the control condition.  
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Materials. 
Rejection of environmental problems. The “possibility of an ecological crisis” 
subscale of the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 
2000) was used as an indicator of rejection of environmental problems. This scale 
consists of three items: “Humans are severely abusing the environment (reversed 
scored)”, “The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been greatly 
exaggerated”, “If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a 
major ecological catastrophe (reversed scored)”. The items were presented on a Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), with higher scores 
reflecting higher levels of rejection of environmental problems (α = .79). 
Kindness-affirmation manipulation. Both the affirmation and the control 
condition were identical to the kindness-affirmation manipulation used in Study 1. 
Climate change information. The climate change information that was 
presented to the participants was identical to the information used in Study 1.  
The outcome measures were introduced to the participants after the information, 
and were all measured on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree).  
Climate change scepticism. The same scale used in Study 1 served as the 
climate change scepticism measure (α = .91).  
Message derogation. Four items (cf. Sparks et al., 2010) assessed message 
derogation (e.g. “I thought the information about climate change was overblown”, α = 
.82). 
Results 
Analytical strategy. The outcome measures were analyzed with hierarchical 
regression analyses. In the first step of the analysis the main effects of kindness-
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affirmation (1 = affirmation vs. 0 = control) and rejection of environmental problems 
(as a mean-centred continuous variable) were entered. The interaction between 
kindness-affirmation and rejection of environmental problems was entered at the second 
step. Means and standard deviations of the outcome measures as a function of kindness-
affirmation are presented in Table 2. 
Climate change scepticism. Rejection of environmental problems emerged as a 
significant predictor of climate change scepticism, such that greater rejection of 
environmental problems was associated with higher levels of scepticism about climate 
change, β = .51, t = 3.90, p < .001, semipartial R2 = .26. There was no significant effect 
of kindness-affirmation on climate change scepticism, β = -.06, t = -.47, p = .64, 
semipartial R
2
 = .004, nor did kindness-affirmation interact with rejection of 
environmental problems, β = .16, t = .98, p = .33, semipartial R2 = .02. 
Message derogation. A significant main effect of rejection of environmental 
problems was found, such that greater rejection of environmental problems was 
associated with higher levels of message derogation, β = .32, t = 2.26, p = .03, 
semipartial R
2
 = .10. There was no significant difference between the kindness-
affirmation conditions in the reported levels of message derogation, β = -.19, t = -1.35, p 
= .18, semipartial R
2
 = .04. No significant interaction between kindness-affirmation and 
rejection of environmental problems was found, β = .24, t = 1.35, p = .18, semipartial R2 
= .04. 
Discussion 
One of the aims of Study 2 was to examine whether prior levels of rejection of 
environmental problems moderated the effects of kindness-affirmation on scepticism 
towards climate change information, and whether this might explain the findings of 
Study 1, in which it was shown that kindness-affirmation increased rather than 
60 
decreased scepticism about climate change. Contrary to both opposing hypotheses, 
rejection of environmental problems did not interact with kindness-affirmation on the 
outcome measures and can therefore not account for the difference in findings between 
Study 1 and the findings from Sparks et al. (2010), who found that kindness affirmation 
decreased climate change scepticism. Moreover, no effects of kindness-affirmation on 
scepticism indicators were found. The pattern of results, although not statistically 
significant, did not suggest any backfire-effects of kindness-affirmation on scepticism 
about climate change or message derogation. This is in contrast to the findings of Study 
1, where self-affirmation led to a backfire-effect on scepticism about climate change. 
One consistent finding in Study 2 was the predictive power of prior levels of rejection 
of environmental problems on the outcome measures. It appears that kindness-
affirmation could not influence the established beliefs of the participants regarding their 
scepticism towards climate change.   
Study 3  
Whereas Study 1 and 2 focused on the effects of a kindness-affirmation, my aim 
in Study 3 was to examine whether a value-affirmation manipulation would influence 
scepticism about climate change and message derogation. The most widely used 
technique to affirm people is to provide a short list of values, from which participants 
are asked to select the value that is most important to them and to write a few sentences 
to describe why this value is important to them (McQueen & Klein, 2006). In Study 2 it 
was found that only prior levels of rejection of environmental problems predicted 
scepticism about climate change and message derogation, while kindness-affirmation 
did not affect these outcome measures. A similar design as in Study 2 was used in Study 
3 to explore whether the use of a different manipulation in the form of a value-
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affirmation could reduce scepticism towards climate change information, and how prior 
levels of rejection of environmental problems may moderate these effects.  
Method 
Participants. Forty psychology undergraduate students (38 females, 2 males)  
participated in the study for course credit. The age of the participants ranged from 18 
years to 30 years (M = 19.08, SD = 2.15). Participants were recruited by email, in which 
the procedure of the study was explained. 
Materials and procedure. Participants were asked to complete a brief online 
survey in which rejection of environmental problems was assessed using the same 
measure as in Study 2 (α = .62). One week later the participants were instructed to 
remain seated after a course lecture in order to complete a second questionnaire, in 
which participants first completed a value-affirmation manipulation that was adapted 
from Sherman et al. (2000, Study 2). Twelve different values were presented to all 
participants (e.g. forgiveness, loyalty, honesty). Participants in the affirmation condition 
were asked to select the value that was most important to them, and to provide a short 
statement about why the selected value was important to them. Participants in the 
control condition were asked to choose their least important value, and to describe why 
this value might be important to someone else. Participants then read the same climate 
change information that was used in Study 1, which was followed by the assessment of 
scepticism about climate change (α = .91) and message derogation (α = .84) using the 
same measures as in Study 1 and 2 respectively.  
Results 
Analytical strategy. Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to analyze 
the results using the same analytic procedure as in Study 2. Means and standard 
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deviations of the outcome measures as a function of value-affirmation are presented in 
Table 3. 
Climate change scepticism. Rejection of environmental problems emerged as a 
significant predictor of climate change scepticism, such that greater rejection of 
environmental problems was associated with higher levels of scepticism about climate 
change, β = .56, t = 4.14, p < .001, semipartial R2 = .31. There was no significant 
difference between the value-affirmation conditions in the reported levels of climate 
change scepticism, β = -.14, t = -1.01, p = .32, semipartial R2 = .02. Furthermore, no 
significant interaction between value-affirmation and rejection of environmental 
problems was found, β = -.07, t = -.35, p = .73, semipartial R2 = .002. 
Message derogation. The analysis yielded no significant main effect of value-
affirmation, β = -.05, t = -.31, p = .76, semipartial R2 = .002, nor rejection of 
environmental problems, β = .25, t = 1.60, p = .12, semipartial R2 = .06, on message 
derogation. The interaction between value-affirmation and rejection of environmental 
problems was not significant, β = -.18, t = -.72,  p = .48, semipartial R2 = .01. 
Discussion 
 In contrast to Study 1 and 2 where a kindness-affirmation manipulation was 
used, Study 3 focused on the effects of a value-affirmation manipulation on scepticism 
about climate change and message derogation, and whether these effects were 
influenced by prior levels of rejection of environmental problems. In line with Study 2, 
however, I found no effects of the value-affirmation manipulation on the outcome 
measures. A value-affirmation manipulation did not lead to lower scepticism towards 
climate change information, which is consistent with the results of Study 2, where no 
effects of the kindness-affirmation on the outcome measures were found. Previous 
research has indicated that the effects of value-affirmation and kindness-affirmation 
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manipulations appear to be similar (Armitage & Rowe, 2011; Jessop et al., 2009). My 
findings in Study 2 and 3 support these results. Furthermore, rejection of environmental 
problems was a predictor of scepticism about climate change, but did not significantly 
predict message derogation.  
General Discussion 
In this research I aimed to examine the effects of self-affirmation on scepticism 
towards climate change information. Whereas self-affirmation has repeatedly been 
shown to decrease defensiveness towards potentially threatening information (Cohen et 
al., 2000; Sherman et al., 2000; Sparks et al., 2010), the results of Study 1 demonstrated 
that self-affirmation led to higher scepticism about climate change. The goal of Study 2 
was to replicate this finding, and to explore whether prior levels of rejection of 
environmental problems could moderate self-affirmation effects. However, no effect of 
self-affirmation was found on either scepticism about climate change or on message 
derogation. These indicators of scepticism towards climate change information were 
only influenced by prior levels of rejection of environmental problems, where more 
rejection of environmental problems was associated with more scepticism towards 
climate change information. While a kindness-affirmation manipulation was used in 
Study 1 and Study 2, Study 3 explored the effects of a value-affirmation manipulation 
on scepticism towards climate change information. In line with Study 2, self-affirmation 
had no influence on scepticism towards climate change. Prior levels of rejection of 
environmental problems did predict scepticism about climate change, such that more 
rejection of environmental problems was associated with more scepticism about climate 
change. These results indicate that scepticism towards climate change information was 
strongly dependent on prior levels of rejection of environmental problems, and that self-
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affirmation could not effectively influence these initial responses to climate change 
information. 
The findings that self-affirmation either had no effect (Study 2 and 3) or a 
detrimental effect (Study 1) on climate change scepticism are in contrast to the findings 
of Sparks et al. (2010), which illustrated a reduction of climate change scepticism 
through self-affirmation. It can only be speculated as to why there is a lack of 
consistency in these findings. A difference that may have had an impact on the 
inconsistency in findings between the studies is the different measure that was used to 
assess climate change scepticism. It would have been beneficial to include the 
scepticism measure used by Sparks et al. in this research to examine whether these 
measures may have led to different self-affirmation effects. It should be noted, however, 
that there was a similarity between certain items within both measures. For this reason I 
suspect that it is unlikely that the difference in climate change scepticism measures 
could explain the contradictory findings. Another explanation is that the different effects 
may potentially stem from the different use of the kindness-affirmation manipulation. 
Whereas I have used the original 10-item manipulation (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998), 
Sparks et al. adapted the manipulation to a shorter 5-item version due to time constraints 
for the participants. It might be that retrieving 5 small acts of kindness is easier for 
people than retrieving 10 small acts of kindness, which may therefore create a more 
effective self-affirmation. Reed and Aspinwall found that their kindness-affirmation 
manipulation decreased biased processing of health-risk information, thereby reflecting 
the effectiveness of the 10-item manipulation. However, the manipulation may have 
distinctive effects when it is applied to an environmental threat. It is important that more 
research is done to explain why these findings might be mixed.  
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Despite the vast amount of literature available on self-affirmation effects on 
responses to threatening information (see Sherman & Cohen, 2006), little is known 
about how affirming self-integrity may affect environmental beliefs. The current 
research has shown inconsistent findings on the effectiveness of self-affirmation on 
climate change scepticism, thereby indicating that further research is merited to explore 
if self-affirmation effects in the environmental domain may resemble or differ from self-
affirmation effects in different domains. It should be considered that climate change 
might represent a different type of threat than has previously been examined in self-
affirmation literature, as it appears to be a multifaceted, collective threat that is 
relatively familiar to most people due to the media coverage on this topic. This 
increased awareness and confrontation with climate change may affect the development 
of more chronically activated defensive responses, which in turn may determine the 
effectiveness of self-affirmation (Harris & Epton, 2010; Sherman & Cohen, 2006).  
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Table 1 
Study 1: Means and standard deviations of manipulation checks as a function of 
kindness-affirmation 
 Affirmation Control 
 M SD M SD 
Self-feelings 4.85 1.27 5.05 1.19 
Mood 4.90 1.33 5.20 1.06 
Kindness 6.75 1.16 6.85 1.23 
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Table 2 
Study 2: Means and standard deviations of outcome measures as a function of kindness-
affirmation 
 Affirmation Control 
 M SD M SD 
Climate change scepticism 2.90 1.29 3.07 0.92 
Message derogation 3.16 1.26 3.65 1.12 
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Table 3 
Study 3: Means and standard deviations of outcome measures as a function of value-
affirmation 
 Affirmation Control 
 M SD M SD 
Climate change scepticism 3.03 0.94 3.37 1.10 
Message derogation 3.56 1.20 3.70 1.01 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Accentuating Ecological Worldviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter was adapted from Van Prooijen, Sparks, and Jessop (in press). The first 
author was the principal investigator for the current research. The second author 
provided suggestions regarding the design of the experiment and commented on the 
manuscript, whereas the third author provided advice on procedures to probe two-way 
interactions in hierarchical regression analyses and commented on the manuscript.  
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Research has repeatedly shown that people strive to maintain a positive image of the 
self, and are motivated to protect this image whenever it is threatened (e.g., Sherman & 
Cohen, 2006). In daily life it is impossible to avoid encounters with self-threats, which 
can include information that challenges cherished beliefs, scientific results pointing out 
health risks, performance evaluations, personality feedback, and so on. People often 
respond defensively by avoiding, dismissing, or denying a threat in order to maintain a 
sense of self-worth (Kunda, 1987; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979), thereby depriving 
themselves of the opportunity to learn from potentially useful information. According to 
self-affirmation theory, this defensiveness can be reduced through affirming a valued 
aspect of the self (Steele, 1988). It suggests that reflecting on important personal values 
affirms a sense of self-integrity, which in turn provides a buffer to self-threats and 
enables individuals to respond to self-threats in a more open and adaptive manner.  
As a result of the focus of self-affirmation theory on the responses to 
information that threatens self-integrity, the majority of research tends to examine self-
affirmation effects using a threatening persuasive message. Self-affirmation has been 
shown to produce a range of beneficial effects in these persuasive contexts, such as less 
defensive processing of threatening messages (Harris & Napper, 2005; Sherman, 
Nelson, & Steele, 2000), stronger intentions to adapt behaviour (Harris & Napper, 2005; 
Sherman et al., 2000), and more openness to self-improvement (Crocker, Niiya, & 
Mischkowski, 2008). In comparison, little is known about the effects of self-affirmation 
when people are not presented with explicit threatening information; that is, in 
situations where people need to rely on their existing cognitions about the topic at hand. 
In the present study, I aimed to extend self-affirmation research by investigating 
whether self-affirmation in the absence of a threatening persuasive message can lead to 
a validation of a person’s initial worldviews.  
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According to the self-validation hypothesis (Petty & Briñol, 2008; Petty, Briñol, 
& Tormala, 2002), one determinant of the extent of persuasion effects is the level of 
confidence that people have in their own thoughts, which in turn can increase both 
reliance on these thoughts to underpin opinions and beliefs in the validity of these 
judgments. Briñol, Petty, Gallardo, and DeMarree (2007) have shown that self-
affirmation can enhance people’s self-confidence in their thoughts in a nonthreatening 
persuasive context: When people were affirmed after reading a persuasive message 
about a new consumer product, self-affirmation increased self-confidence in the validity 
of thoughts regarding the message. However, it has not been examined how affirming 
self-worth may influence responses to familiar threats in a nonpersuasive context. The 
present study will address this issue by focusing on the effects of self-affirmation on 
established beliefs about an ongoing environmental threat.  
Surprisingly, research has only recently started to focus on the potential 
effectiveness of self-affirmation as an intervention device to influence pro-
environmental motivation (Sparks, Jessop, Chapman, & Holmes, 2010). Despite 
scientific evidence about the human contribution to climate change and the catastrophic 
consequences humans are likely to face (IPCC, 2007a), people often tend to downplay 
climate change and reject information on this topic (Dickinson, 2009). Due to the 
urgency of these environmental problems, I believe that the application of self-
affirmation theory to the psychology of climate change threats merits further research.  
The persuasive messages that are presented in self-affirmation research often 
contain relatively new information about a behaviour-specific, individual threat in order 
to test how self-affirmation may affect responses to these threats (for reviews, see Harris 
& Epton, 2010; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). However, these threats appear to be quite 
different from climate change, which can be considered to be a collective and pervasive 
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threat that presents an intangible risk for most individuals. Most people in the western 
world possess a certain amount of background information about climate change and 
have heard about the dangers that climate change can bring (Reser & Swim, 2011). 
People are confronted with the severity of climate change and its consequences on a 
regular basis through the media, and have formed opinions about environmental 
problems that have become incorporated into their belief systems. Due to the 
established beliefs that people have about climate change and due to the nature of the 
threat that climate change poses, it is important to examine the effects of self-
affirmation under conditions in which no explicit information is presented and where 
people have to access their prior beliefs about, and attitudes towards, environmental 
threats. In the present study, I examined whether existing ecological worldviews (in a 
nonpersuasive context) might moderate self-affirmation effects on the following 
indicators of people’s pro-environmental motives: perceptions of pro-environmental 
behaviour as a personal moral principle, perceptions of the effort required to reduce 
one’s carbon footprint, perceived self-efficacy with regard to pro-environmental 
behaviour, and intentions to carry out pro-environmental actions. 
I propose that self-affirmation may polarise orientations towards environment-
related actions. Self-affirmation has been shown to enhance self-confidence in the 
validity of one’s opinions (Briñol et al., 2007). When people hold previously formed 
opinions on an issue and these opinions are not subjected to a persuasive message, self-
affirmation might potentially serve to encourage people to trust their initial position; 
that is, to affirm their current worldviews. Thus, I hypothesized that self-affirmation can 
accentuate previously-held ecological worldviews. This would produce more pro-
environmental responses among people with positive ecological worldviews, who are 
concerned about the environment and who believe that the natural environment is 
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highly susceptible to human interference (Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000). 
In contrast, I expected that self-affirmation would lead to less environmental responses 
among people who are less concerned about the environment and who are sceptical, for 
example, about the role of human intervention in climate change processes (i.e., among 
people with negative ecological worldviews). 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety (76 female, 14 male) non-psychology students at a UK university 
participated in this study. Their ages ranged from 18 years to 48 years (M = 22.32, SD = 
5.81). Participants who completed the study were automatically included in a prize draw 
in which they had a chance of winning £100.  
Design and Procedure 
Participants were invited by email to participate in an online study that consisted 
of two questionnaires. The email message included the link to the first questionnaire, 
which directed participants to a short pretest. In this pretest, ecological worldviews were 
assessed with the revised New Ecological Paradigm scale (NEP; Dunlap et al., 2000), 
which consisted of 15 items (e.g. “Humans are severely abusing the environment”, 1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), α = .75.  
To reduce possible effects of ecological worldview salience, a link to the second 
questionnaire of the study was sent to the participants one week after completion of the 
pretest. Participants were sequentially assigned to the affirmation or to the control 
condition.  
Self-affirmation manipulation. A list containing nine values (e.g. honesty, 
kindness, loyalty) was presented to the participants in the affirmation condition (n = 43), 
which was adapted from Sherman et al. (2000, Study 2). Participants were asked to 
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select the value that was most important to them, to write a short statement about why it 
was important to them and how they used the selected value in their everyday life. 
Participants in the control condition (n = 47) completed a task similar to that used by 
Cohen, Aronson and Steele (2000, Study 1), in which participants were asked to list 
everything that they had eaten or drunk in the previous 48 hours. 
After the self-affirmation manipulation, participants completed the dependent 
measures. All responses were provided on Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree); measures were constructed from the means of the 
constitutive items. 
Moral judgment. Moral judgment about pro-environmental behaviour was 
measured with two items: “It seems ethical to me to adjust one’s lifestyle in order to 
protect the earth” and “Trying to reduce your carbon footprint is the right thing to do”, 
r(88) = .73, p < .001.  
Perceived effort required to reduce carbon footprint. Five items were 
developed to assess the perceived effort it would require to reduce one’s own carbon 
footprint (e.g. “It would take much effort to reduce my carbon footprint”), α = .88.  
Self-efficacy. Five items (adapted from Van Zomeren, Spears & Leach, 2010) 
assessed self-efficacy with regard to pro-environmental behaviour (e.g. “There are 
simple things I can do that contribute to preventing the negative consequences of 
climate change”), α = .90.  
Pro-environmental intentions. Six items were used to measure intentions to 
increase pro-environmental behaviour (e.g. “I intend to reduce my carbon footprint from 
now on”), α = .98.  
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Results 
Two-step hierarchical regression analyses were performed to examine the effects 
of self-affirmation (1 = affirmation vs. 0 = control), ecological worldviews (as a mean-
centred continuous variable), and the two-way interaction on each outcome measure. 
The moderating effects of ecological worldviews were probed further by conducting 
separate regression analyses for the affirmation and the control conditions, and by 
comparing the effects of self-affirmation separately for positive ecological worldview 
participants and negative ecological worldview participants (assessed at 1 SD above and 
below the mean, as recommended by Aiken and West, 1991).  
Moral judgment. The analysis of moral judgment yielded a significant 
interaction between self-affirmation and ecological worldviews, β = .32, t = 2.65, p = 
.01, semipartial R
2
 = .07. (see Figure 1). Ecological worldviews were a significant 
predictor of moral judgment in the affirmation condition, β = .55, t = 4.21, p < .001, R2 
= .30. There was no significant effect of ecological worldviews in the control condit ion, 
β = .18, t = 1.20, p = .24, R2 = .03. As predicted, negative ecological worldview 
participants reported less pro-environmental moral judgments about lifestyle change in 
the affirmation condition than in the control condition, β = -.31, t = -2.22, p = .03. The 
effect of self-affirmation on moral judgments for positive ecological worldview 
participants did not reach statistical significance, β = .23, t = 1.61, p = .11; however, 
participants with very positive ecological worldviews (1.5 SD above the mean) reported 
significantly more pro-environmental moral judgments in the affirmation condition than 
in the control condition, β = .36, t = 1.99, p = .05.  
Perceived effort required to reduce carbon footprint. A significant 
interaction effect between self-affirmation and ecological worldviews was found on 
perceived effort required to reduce carbon footprint, β = -.49, t = -3.90, p < .001, 
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semipartial R
2
 = .15 (see Figure 2). Ecological worldviews were a stronger predictor of 
perceived effort required to reduce carbon footprint in the affirmation condition, β = -
.42, t = -2.99, p = .005, R
2
 = .18, than in the control condition, β = .33, t = 2.32, p = .03, 
R
2
 = .11. As predicted, negative ecological worldview participants reported more 
perceived effort in the affirmation condition than in the control condition, β = .37, t = 
2.57, p = .01. By contrast, positive ecological worldview participants reported less 
perceived effort in the affirmation condition than in the control condition, β = -.44, t = -
3.07, p = .003.  
Self-efficacy. The analysis of self-efficacy yielded a marginally significant 
interaction between self-affirmation and ecological worldviews, β = .23, t = 1.87, p = 
.07, semipartial R
2
 = .04 (see Figure 3). Ecological worldviews were a significant 
predictor of self-efficacy in the affirmation condition, β = .47, t = 3.45, p = .001, R2 = 
.23. There was no significant effect of ecological worldviews in the control condition, β 
= .22, t = 1.50, p = .14, R
2
 = .05. As predicted, negative ecological worldview 
participants reported lower levels of self-efficacy regarding pro-environmental 
behaviour in the affirmation condition than in the control condition, β = -.28, t = -1.99, 
p = .05. There was no effect of self-affirmation on self-efficacy for positive ecological 
worldview participants, β = .10, t = .72, p = .47.  
Pro-environmental intentions. There was a main effect of self-affirmation on 
pro-environmental intentions, β = .24, t = 2.35, p = .02, semipartial R2 = .06: 
Participants in the affirmation condition reported greater intentions to reduce their 
carbon footprint (M = 5.09, SD = 1.06) than did their counterparts in the control 
condition (M = 4.55, SD = 1.17). There was no significant interaction between self-
affirmation and ecological worldviews, β = .15, t = 1.15, p = .25, semipartial R2 = .01. It 
is noteworthy, however, that the planned contrasts revealed that positive ecological 
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worldview participants reported stronger pro-environmental intentions in the 
affirmation condition than in the control condition, β = .37, t = 2.46, p = .02, whereas 
negative ecological worldview participants did not, β = .12, t = .81, p = .42 (see Figure 
4). 
Discussion 
Previous research has shown that self-affirmation can reduce defensive 
responses to messages that focus on individual threats. However, little is known about 
the effects of self-affirmation in a nonpersuasive context on existing cognitions about a 
familiar collective threat that is largely beyond an individual’s control, such as climate 
change. In this research, I proposed that self-affirmation can bolster orientations 
towards environment-related actions when people only have recourse to their existing 
beliefs. Whereas self-affirmation manipulations that include a persuasive threatening 
message have been shown to promote more openness to threats to the self (e.g., 
Sherman & Cohen, 2006), my results are compatible with the suggestion that self-
affirmation without such a message can promote a validation of previously-held beliefs 
towards potentially threatening issues. More specifically, my findings showed that 
ecological worldview effects were accentuated through self-affirmation in the absence 
of a threatening persuasive message. Self-affirmation led to more pro-environmental 
responses to climate change among participants with positive ecological worldviews 
and to less pro-environmental responses to climate change among participants with 
negative ecological worldviews.   
I found that self-affirmation resulted in more pro-environmental responses only 
among those participants who are likely to be amenable to the idea of adapting one’s 
environment-related behaviour. Individuals with (very) positive ecological worldviews 
reported more pro-environmental moral judgments, less perceived effort involved in 
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reducing their carbon footprint, and more positive pro-environmental intentions in the 
self-affirmation condition compared to the control condition. It should be noted that 
self-affirmation did not increase self-efficacy with regard to pro-environmental 
behaviour for positive ecological worldview participants. This could potentially be due 
to ceiling effects, as participants with positive ecological worldviews reported high 
levels of self-efficacy in the control condition. By contrast, self-affirmation resulted in 
less pro-environmental responses among participants who might be expected to be more 
resistant to adapting their environment-related behaviours. Thus, self-affirmed 
participants with negative ecological worldviews reported less pro-environmental moral 
judgments, more perceived effort involved in reducing their carbon footprint, and 
marginally lower levels of self-efficacy regarding the performance of pro-environmental 
behaviours compared to their counterparts in the control condition. Interestingly, self-
affirmation did not appear to influence the pro-environmental intentions of negative 
ecological worldview participants. Further research is required to explore more fully the 
boundary conditions of self-affirmation manipulation effects on intentions and other 
pro-environmental responses.  
In previous research, self-affirmation has been shown to increase self-confidence 
in the validity of one’s own thoughts regarding a nonthreatening persuasive message 
(Briñol et al., 2007). The current study extends this finding by showing that the effects 
of self-affirmation are not limited to a validation of cognitive responses to 
nonthreatening messages, but it can also lead to a polarization of environmental 
orientations in a nonpersuasive context. Although I did not explore the underlying 
processes that accompany these validations of ecological worldviews, I suspect that 
self-affirmation may enhance self-confidence in established beliefs about a familiar 
topic when no persuasive message is presented. In the absence of a threatening 
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persuasive message, self-affirmation may induce a greater reliance on prior knowledge 
and opinions due to an increase in self-confidence (Briñol et al., 2007). An alternative 
explanation for the polarization of established beliefs about environmental threats 
through self-affirmation is that by writing about personally important values, the self-
concept tends to become clearer and more coherent (Wakslak & Trope, 2009), which 
may in turn result in stronger beliefs. These two explanations are clearly not mutually 
exclusive and subsequent studies might usefully explore the potentially differential 
pathways through which self-affirmation can validate personal convictions. 
Previous self-affirmation research has indicated that people tend to be more 
defensive about beliefs that are important to their self-concept. Self-affirmation 
manipulations have consequently been shown to be most effective in individuals for 
whom a threat is of high perceived personal relevance (Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 
2004; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998). However, the role of the perceived personal relevance 
or importance of climate change issues in self-affirmation effects is likely to be more 
complex, since climate change can be construed as a global threat that is potentially 
relevant to everyone. Whereas it is relatively commonplace to categorize people in 
terms of the personal relevance of behaviour-specific individual threats, I suggest that 
the perceived importance of reducing carbon footprints to mitigate climate change 
effects might be approached as a continuum on which more polarized views reflect 
greater personal issue involvement. The current findings are consistent with this 
suggestion in that self-affirmation primarily influenced people with more polarized 
environmental orientations.  
In conclusion, my results showed that self-affirmation can accentuate 
previously-held environmental orientations when no information is introduced to 
challenge those beliefs. These issues clearly need to be explored in more detail. 
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However, I feel that this study provides an important initial step in our understanding of 
the contextual and personal conditions under which self-affirmation may motivate 
people to tread more carefully with their own carbon footprints. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Moral judgment regressed onto ecological worldview, by self-affirmation. 
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Figure 2. Perceived effort to reduce carbon footprint regressed onto ecological 
worldview, by self-affirmation.  
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Figure 3. Self-efficacy regressed onto ecological worldview, by self-affirmation.  
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Figure 4. Pro-environmental intentions regressed onto ecological worldview, by self-
affirmation.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Perceptions of Climate Change Consequences
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter was adapted from Van Prooijen and Sparks (submitted). The first author 
was the principal investigator for the current research. The second author provided 
suggestions regarding the design of the experiment and commented on the manuscript.
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Despite the urgency of climate change and the scientific consensus about the role of 
human impact on this process (Oreskes, 2004), persuading people of the reality of 
climate change consequences remains a scientific and social challenge. Perceptions of 
the dangers of climate change are often underestimated (Leiserowitz, 2005) and 
information describing severe climate change consequences is often rejected by the 
public (Langford, 2002), which in turn can negatively affect the willingness to address 
these problems (O’Connor, Bord, & Fisher, 1999). The current research aims to 
determine if the acceptance of climate change consequences is increased through self-
affirmation. I suggest that affirming one’s self-image by reflecting on personally 
important values can promote more acceptance of climate change information and 
stronger perceived control over a collective threat that is climate change.  
Defensiveness and self-affirmation 
Several environmental campaigns have been designed to inform people about 
climate change and to increase the perceptions of the dangers attached to it. However, 
an obstacle that can undermine persuasion in this process is that people may have a 
tendency to resist that climate change poses a serious threat (Langford, 2002), thereby 
affecting the way in which information is processed. For instance, people have been 
shown to be motivated to judge information with a self-serving bias in order to confirm 
their original beliefs and to maintain an unrealistic sense of optimism about the 
probability that undesirable outcomes will not affect them personally (Ditto & Lopez, 
1992; Kunda, 1987; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). 
Furthermore, climate change can induce a level of fear due to the association with 
uncertainty and mortality issues, which in turn facilitates a defensive avoidance of 
threatening information about environmental risks (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & 
Welch, 2001; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). Through these defensive 
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mechanisms, the learning and persuasion outcomes about climate change dangers that 
could potentially result from an open and unbiased approach to information processing 
may be hampered, reducing the likelihood that people will adjust their views and 
subsequent actions. 
Self-affirmation theory suggests that people are strongly motivated to maintain a 
positive self-image, and defensive mechanisms can originate in situations where this 
positive self-image is threatened (Steele, 1988). When people are confronted with 
information that harms their positive self-image, they may seek to defend this image by 
denying the information. A more constructive strategy to maintain a positive self-image 
is by affirming a value that is important to the self-concept. By reflecting on important 
aspects of their self-image, people are reminded that the threat does not have to lead to a 
reduction in self-worth. The affirmation of their self-image can provide a buffer against 
the threatening information, allowing people to adopt a more open and adaptive 
information-processing strategy. The notion that self-affirmation reduces defensiveness 
has been supported in a range of studies. For instance, self-affirmation has been shown 
to increase objectivity in the evaluation of counterattitudinal information (Cohen, 
Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004), promote beneficial health-
related intentions and behaviours (Jessop, Simmonds & Sparks, 2009; Sherman, Nelson, 
& Steele, 2000; Van Koningsbruggen, Das, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2009), and lead to less 
defensiveness and more message acceptance when people are confronted with 
threatening health-related information (Harris & Napper, 2005; Sherman et al., 2000).  
The present research 
While self-affirmation has shown to lead to a greater acknowledgement of 
potential risks, these findings have mainly been tested using health-related risk 
messages (Harris & Napper, 2005; Sherman et al., 2000). In the present study I 
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examined whether self-affirmation can also promote greater message acceptance in 
conditions where the threat is not focused on specific personal threats, but is instead 
focused on a global collective threat to humanity. Climate change involves a variety of 
threats, such as loss of habitat and biodiversity, reduced economic growth, and 
increased intergroup conflicts about scarce resources, as well as threats to personal 
physical health (IPCC, 2007b; Stern, 2006). Simultaneously, however, climate change 
brings a high level of uncertainty in terms of personal risk; climate change is often seen 
as a relatively abstract threat that is highly unlikely to directly affect the individual 
(Weber, 2006). In contrast, people are likely to be more aware of the risk of developing 
a disease due to the impact of health risk-increasing factors such as genetics and specific 
health-behaviours (e.g. smoking, excessive alcohol consumption; Croyle & Lerman, 
1999; Steptoe & Wardle, 2001). It is therefore important to extend self-affirmation 
research by establishing if affirming personal self-worth can also increase the 
acceptance of collective, global risks. Additionally, the current study examined whether 
self-affirmation can promote the generalization of global climate change consequences 
targeted by the message to perceptions of (more proximal) national effects of climate 
change that are not explicitly addressed in the message. A generalization to national 
consequences of climate change would suggest that the belief that climate change will 
not pose a serious risk to one’s own society can be reduced as a result of affirming one’s 
self-image. 
Self-affirmation has been shown to lead to higher perceived efficacy of lowering 
the chances of developing health problems (Epton & Harris, 2008; Harris, Mayle, 
Mabbott, & Napper, 2007) and to lower minimization of self-involvement in climate 
change problems (Sparks, Jessop, Chapman, & Holmes, 2010), but it is unknown if self-
affirmation can empower people to believe that their actions can have a positive effect 
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on the mitigation of a global threat such as climate change. A barrier to motivate people 
to address climate change is the belief that individual efforts to reduce carbon emissions 
will have little to no impact (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007; 
O’Connor, Bord, & Fisher, 1998). I included measures of self-efficacy about reducing 
the consequences of climate change and pessimism induced by climate change 
information in order to examine whether self-affirmation can promote perceived 
individual control over climate change mitigation. Correspondingly, pro-environmental 
intentions were also assessed to see if self-affirmation increases the acceptance of the 
personal implications of climate change with regard to reducing carbon emissions.  
Furthermore, in the current study I tested whether initial beliefs about the impact 
of human interference on ecological stability would moderate the effects of self-
affirmation on the acceptance of climate change information. I expected that 
information illustrating climate change dangers should evoke high defensiveness among 
people who are sceptical about the idea that human actions can alter ecological stability, 
since the information represents a counterattitudinal view for them. I therefore predicted 
that self-affirmation would promote greater message acceptance in this specific group. 
In contrast, it is likely that people who are less sceptical about the human impact on 
ecological stability will have higher initial perceptions of climate change consequences. 
Defensive responses towards climate change information should therefore be lower, 
which should minimize the impact of self-affirmation in this group. 
Method 
Participants  
Eighty-eight non-psychology students at a UK university (70 females, 18 males) 
participated in this study. The age of the participants ranged from 18 years to 42 years 
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(M = 21.70, SD = 4.07). Participants were automatically included in a prize draw in 
which they had a chance to win £100. 
Design and procedure.  
Participants were approached via email and invited to participate in an online 
study that consisted of two questionnaires. The first questionnaire contained the 
measure of initial beliefs about the human impact on ecological stability. A link to the 
second questionnaire was sent to the participants one week after completion of the first 
questionnaire. Participants were sequentially assigned to the affirmation or the control 
condition. Following the self-affirmation manipulation, participants were asked to read 
the climate change information. Finally, the outcome measures were administered.   
Materials  
Initial beliefs. Initial beliefs about the human impact on ecological stability 
were measured with the “fragility of nature’s balance” subscale of the New Ecological 
Paradigm (NEP; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000), which consisted of three 
items (e.g. “The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern 
industrial nations”). The items were presented on a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), with lower scores reflecting higher levels of 
scepticism about the impact of human actions on ecological stability (α = .65).1  
Self-affirmation manipulation. Participants in the affirmation condition (n = 
41) were given a list of nine values (e.g. altruism, fairness, forgiveness; adapted from 
Sherman et al., 2000, Study 2). Participants selected the value that was most important 
to them, and wrote a short statement about why it was important to them and how they 
used the selected value in their everyday life. Participants in the control condition (n = 
47) listed everything that they had eaten or drunk in the past 48 hours (adapted from 
Cohen et al., 2000, Study 1).  
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Climate change information. Participants read a text from the United Nations 
(n.d.) about the impact of human activity on climate change, the increase in greenhouse 
gas emissions in comparison to pre-industrial values, how the impacts of climate change 
can become more manageable through global mitigation action, and what the possible 
scenarios for vulnerable populations are if no effort is taken to reduce the global 
emission of greenhouse gasses.  
Outcome measures. All outcome measures were assessed on Likert-type scales 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). A definition of a carbon 
footprint was provided before the items were presented.  
Perceptions of global consequences. Perceptions of negative global climate 
change consequences were assessed with three items (adapted from Leiserowitz, 2005; 
e.g. “I think that it is likely that there will be an increase in rates of disease worldwide 
due to climate change in the next 50 years if carbon emissions are not significantly 
reduced”, α = .85). 
Perceptions of national consequences. The same three items that were used to 
measure perceptions of negative global climate change consequences were modified to 
assess perceptions of the impact of climate change on the UK (e.g. “I think that it is 
likely that there will be a decrease in standards of living in the UK due to climate 
change in the next 50 years if carbon emissions are not significantly reduced”, α = .90). 
Self-efficacy. Four items (adapted from Van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2010) 
assessed self-efficacy with regard to reducing the consequences of climate change (e.g. 
“There are simple things I can do that contribute to preventing the negative 
consequences of climate change”, α = .90). 
Pessimism. Pessimism induced by climate change information was measured 
with four items (“When I read the information about climate change that was presented 
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earlier, I felt…” [hopeless, a general feeling of pessimism, a sense of futility, helpless], 
α = .79). 
Pro-environmental intentions. Six items were used to measure pro-
environmental intentions (e.g. “I intend to reduce my carbon footprint from now on”, α 
= .98). 
Results 
A hierarchical regression analysis was conducted for each outcome measure to 
examine (a) the main effects of self-affirmation and initial beliefs, and (b) if the effects 
of self-affirmation were moderated by initial beliefs. The dummy-coded self-affirmation 
condition (1 = affirmation vs. 0 = control) and initial beliefs (as a mean-centred 
continuous variable) were entered as main effects in the first step of the analysis. The 
interaction between self-affirmation and initial beliefs was added at step 2. A significant 
interaction was examined by calculating simple slopes for less sceptical versus more 
sceptical participants (i.e. 1 SD above and below the mean initial beliefs scores, as 
recommended by Aiken and West, 1991). Bivariate correlations between the outcome 
measures are displayed in Table 4. 
Perceptions of global consequences. Initial beliefs emerged as a significant 
predictor of perceptions of global consequences: Stronger belief in the human impact on 
ecological stability was associated with higher perceived negative global consequences 
of climate change, β = .42, t = 4.30, p < .001, semipartial R2 = .18. Furthermore, the 
analysis revealed a significant interaction effect, β = -.25, t = -2.04, p = .05, semipartial 
R
2
 = .04 (see Figure 5). A marginally significant effect of self-affirmation was found 
among more sceptical participants, who reported higher perceptions of negative global 
climate change consequences in the affirmation condition than in the control condition, 
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β = .26, t = 1.81, p = .07. No significant difference between conditions was found 
among less sceptical participants, β = -.15, t = -1.10, p = .27. 
Perceptions of national consequences. The analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of initial beliefs: Stronger belief in the human impact on ecological stability was 
associated with higher perceived negative national consequences of climate change, β = 
.37, t = 3.64, p < .001, semipartial R
2
 = .13. Furthermore, a significant interaction effect 
was found, β = -.32, t = -2.59, p = .01, semipartial R2 = .06 (see Figure 6). In line with 
my hypothesis, more sceptical participants reported higher perceptions of negative 
national climate change consequences in the affirmation condition than in the control 
condition, β = .33, t = 2.33, p = .02. There was no effect of self-affirmation on 
perceptions of national climate change risk for less sceptical participants, β = -.19, t = -
1.37, p = .18. 
Self-efficacy. A marginally significant main effect of self-affirmation on self-
efficacy was found, β = .17, t = 1.73, p = .09, semipartial R2 =.03. Participants in the 
affirmation condition reported greater self-efficacy (M = 5.48, SD = 1.11) than 
participants in the control condition (M = 4.87, SD = 1.56). Furthermore, a significant 
main effect of initial beliefs emerged: Stronger belief in the human impact on ecological 
stability was associated with greater self-efficacy with regard to reducing the 
consequences of climate change, β = .36, t = 3.61, p = .001, semipartial R2 = .13. These 
main effects were qualified by a significant interaction effect, β = -.34, t = -2.78, p = 
.007, semipartial R
2
 = .07 (see Figure 7). As predicted, more sceptical participants 
reported greater self-efficacy in the affirmation condition than in the control condition, 
β = .46, t = 3.25, p = .002. In contrast, there was no significant difference between 
conditions among less sceptical participants, β = - .09, t = - .68, p = .50. 
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Pessimism. The analysis showed that initial beliefs were a significant predictor 
of pessimism: Stronger belief in the human impact on ecological stability evoked 
greater pessimism about the climate change information, β = .36, t = 3.56, p = .001, 
semipartial R
2
 = .13. Furthermore, a significant interaction effect was found, β = -.32, t 
= -2.52, p = .01, semipartial R
2
 = .06 (see Figure 8). The effect of self-affirmation on 
pessimism did not reach significance among more sceptical participants, β = .23, t = 
1.59, p = .12. However, less sceptical participants reported lower levels of pessimism 
about the climate change information in the affirmation condition than in the control 
condition, β = -.28, t = -2.03, p = .05. 
Pro-environmental intentions. Initial beliefs emerged as a significant predictor 
of pro-environmental intentions: Stronger belief in the human impact on ecological 
stability was associated with more pro-environmental intentions, β = .25, t = 2.36, p = 
.02, semipartial R
2
 = .06. However, no significant main effect of self-affirmation, β = 
.06, t = 0.56, p = .58, semipartial R
2
 = .004, nor interaction effect between initial beliefs 
and self-affirmation were found, β = -.20, t = -1.51, p = .14, semipartial R2 = .02. 
Discussion 
Whereas previous research has mainly focused on the effects of self-affirmation 
on the acceptance of health-risk information, the present study is the first that has 
examined self-affirmation effects on perceptions of the dangers of  - and perceived 
control over - an ongoing global threat that is climate change. As hypothesized, my 
findings showed that self-affirmation increased perceptions of both negative global and 
national climate change consequences among participants with initially sceptical beliefs, 
which suggests that self-affirmation effects are not solely limited to the acceptance of a 
distant threat that was targeted by the provided information, but instead can also 
promote a generalization to more proximal risks of climate change to one’s own country 
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that are not explicitly mentioned in the information. Furthermore, I found that self-
affirmation led to more self-efficacy with regard to reducing the consequences of 
climate change. This finding is important as it suggests that the belief that individual 
behaviour cannot effectively lead to a mitigation of a global problem such as climate 
change (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; O’Connor et al., 1998) can be attenuated through self-
affirmation, which in turn may facilitate a more positive and open approach to 
individual actions aimed at reducing carbon emissions.  
This research also highlighted the moderating role of initial beliefs about the 
human impact on ecological stability on self-affirmation effects. I anticipated that self-
affirmation effects on the acceptance of climate change risk information would only be 
apparent among people who were sceptical about the impact of human interference on 
ecological stability, since this group is likely to have lower perceptions of 
anthropogenic climate change effects. In support of this prediction, my findings 
revealed that self-affirmation only led to higher perceptions of climate change 
consequences and to greater self-efficacy among participants with initially sceptical 
beliefs about the idea that human actions can alter ecological stability. An exception 
was found in the decrease in pessimism that was evoked by the climate change 
information among affirmed less sceptical participants who acknowledged the impact of 
humans on ecological stability, whereas information-induced pessimism was not 
influenced by self-affirmation among initially more sceptical participants. However, 
research has shown that thinking about climate change tends to be associated with 
feelings of pessimism and helplessness among people who are concerned about the 
environment (Norgaard, 2006). In line with these findings, my results demonstrated that 
less sceptical participants reported higher levels of information-induced pessimism 
about climate change in the control condition than did more sceptical participants, 
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which makes the potential ability of self-affirmation to reduce pessimism more apparent 
in this group.      
Despite these positive effects of self-affirmation on perceptions of climate 
change consequences and perceived individual control over climate change outcomes, I 
found no evidence of self-affirmation promoting an increase in pro-environmental 
intentions. However, the effects of self-affirmation on intentions to adapt behaviour 
have been shown to differ from the effects on other outcome measures (Reed & 
Aspinwall, 1998; Van Prooijen, Sparks, & Jessop, in press). I suspect that committing to 
an actual change in behaviour through the expression of intentions is a complex step 
that is dependent on various factors (Ajzen, 1991), and may therefore not be a suitable 
indicator of the acceptance of risk information. Furthermore, it is important to note that 
the measurement of perceptions of national climate change consequences was focused 
on potential climate change effects for the UK within the next 50 years. The finding that 
self-affirmation promotes higher perceptions of negative national consequences may 
suggest that initially sceptical people are more likely to accept the potential risk of being 
personally affected by climate change when they are self-affirmed. However, it is 
necessary for future research to assess whether the belief that climate change problems 
will not have personal consequences is attenuated through self-affirmation by assessing 
personal risk perceptions of climate change within a more proximal time frame. 
Conclusion  
The present study has extended previous research by showing that reflecting on 
important personal values can enhance the acceptance of risk information that is focused 
on a global threat to humanity among people who are initially resistant to this 
information. Self-affirmation does not only increase the acceptance of global climate 
change consequences, but it also promotes a generalization to accept the more proximal 
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risks of climate change and it empowers people to believe in their own efficacy to 
reduce climate change outcomes. Thus, affirming one’s self-image can promote greater 
risk acceptance of and more perceived individual control over a collective, multifaceted 
threat that is climate change among people who are initially sceptical about the impact 
of human interference on ecological stability. 
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Footnote 
1
 The reliability of the “fragility of nature’s balance” subscale of the NEP 
increased when the item “When humans interfere with nature it often produces 
disastrous consequences” was removed from the subscale (α = .73). However, excluding 
this item from the subscale did not significantly influence the results. It was therefore 
decided to use the complete “fragility of nature’s balance” NEP subscale. 
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Table 4 
Bivariate correlations between outcome measures (N = 88) 
Outcome measures 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Perceptions of global consequences - - - - - 
2. Perceptions of national consequences .63*** - - - - 
3. Self-efficacy .42*** .42*** - - - 
4. Pro-environmental intentions .53*** .57*** .48*** - - 
5. Pessimism .31** .18 .18 .005 - 
 
** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Figures 
 
Figure 5. Perceptions of global climate change consequences regressed onto initial 
beliefs scores, by self-affirmation. 
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Figure 6. Perceptions of national climate change consequences regressed onto initial 
beliefs scores, by self-affirmation. 
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Figure 7. Self-efficacy with regard to reducing the consequences of climate change 
regressed onto initial beliefs scores, by self-affirmation. 
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Figure 8. Pessimism about climate change regressed onto initial beliefs scores, by self-
affirmation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Group-Affirmation Versus Self-Affirmation 
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In contexts where multiple groups are negatively contributing to a problem of 
common resources and where collective action is deemed appropriate but is not properly 
implemented, group members are likely to justify the impact of their group to the 
problem as the responsibility of each individual group is diffused (Gifford, 2008; Kerr, 
1983; Komorita & Lapworth, 1982). One such context is climate change, which 
presents a global problem for which many nations share a responsibility due to their 
high levels of greenhouse gas emissions and unsustainable consumption of resources 
(IPCC, 2007a; Stern, 2006). Yet, there is a tendency among citizens to minimize the 
impact of one’s nation on climate change by asserting that their contribution is 
insignificant compared to other nations, and that their nation is relatively powerless to 
mitigate climate change consequences (Norgaard, 2006; Opotow & Weiss, 2000).  
Being confronted with harmful actions conducted by a group or nation to which 
we belong can provoke a strong desire to justify these actions in order to protect our 
social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The motivation to maintain a favourable 
perception of an important ingroup can increase defensive biases that are manifested by, 
for example, attributing blame to an outgroup (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & 
Schmader, 2006). In this study I contrasted the effects of affirmations of the individual 
self (self-affirmation) to affirmations of the collective self (group-affirmation) on the 
need to justify the actions of one’s nation in a climate change context. Whereas both 
affirmation strategies have been shown to be effective in coping with collective threats 
to identity (Gunn & Wilson, 2011; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Sherman, Kinias, Major, 
Kim, & Prenovost, 2007), I aim to determine whether group-affirmation, in comparison 
to self-affirmation, can increase resistance towards the acceptance of the contribution of 
one’s nation to climate change, and whether national identification and ecological 
worldviews may moderate these effects.  
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Self-affirmation and the collective identity 
According to self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), people can respond 
defensively to information that threatens an important aspect of their self-concept. 
These defensive responses can be attenuated if people engage in the affirmation of 
alternative sources of self-worth. The bolstering of general self-integrity allows people 
to maintain a positive self-image and reduces the need to distort the threat. Several 
studies have demonstrated that self-affirmation promotes a more open and less biased 
approach to information that threatens the individual self-identity (Cohen, Aronson, & 
Steele, 2000; Harris & Napper, 2005; Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000). However, self-
affirmation can also be an effective strategy to cope with threats to the collective self-
identity (Sherman & Cohen, 2006); people derive self-worth from their group 
membership and the concepts of collective identity and individual identity are 
fundamentally entwined (Cohen & Garcia, 2005; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002).  
As group membership can be an important part of self-definition, people are 
motivated to defend the positive image of both their individual self and their collective 
self. The affirmation of an aspect of the individual self-identity that is unrelated to the 
collective threat can help to restore or boost the perception of general self-worth. For 
example, performance on ability-diagnostic tasks is undermined in situations where 
people experience stereotype threat, which presents a threat to the collective self as 
people are concerned about confirming a negative stereotype about their group (Steele 
& Aronson, 1995). However, studies have demonstrated that stereotype threat was 
reduced by affirming a valued aspect of the self-concept, which in turn increased task 
performance (Martens, Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel, 2006; Schimel, Arndt, Banko, & 
Cook, 2004). Additionally, self-affirmation has been shown to reduce the denial of 
racism against stigmatized groups (Adams, Tormala, & O’Brien, 2006), to decrease 
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prejudiced evaluations (Fein & Spencer, 1997), and to increase support for Black 
programs among White individuals (Harvey & Oswald, 2000). These results provide 
support for the notion that affirming a valued aspect of the individual’s self-image can 
make a threat to collective identity more endurable, as the collective identity is a part of 
the self-definition (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). 
The gain of group-affirmation  
Recently, research has started to examine the effects of group-affirmation on 
responses to threats to the collective self. Group-affirmation can enhance the social 
identity by boosting the positive distinctiveness of the group, and has been shown to 
reduce defensiveness that stems from collective threats (Derks, Scheepers, Van Laar, & 
Ellemers, 2011; Derks, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2009; Gunn & Wilson, 2011; Miron, 
Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010; Sherman et al., 2007). However, the added value of 
group-affirmation to self-affirmation can be called into question, as the affirmation of 
the individual self can also provide a buffer against collective threats (Gunn & Wilson, 
2011; Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Furthermore, it has been argued that the collective self 
is subordinate to the individual self as a basis of the self-definition (Gaertner, Sedikides, 
& Graetz, 1999), which can imply that people’s main concern is to maintain a positive 
individual self-image and that group-affirmation may therefore be redundant in 
comparison to self-affirmation. Studies have demonstrated, however, that group-
affirmation and self-affirmation can differ in terms of their effectiveness in coping with 
collective threats depending on the extent to which people perceive their group to be a 
part of their self-definition. For example, group-affirmation was advantageous over self-
affirmation for highly identified group members in a context where they experienced 
stereotype threat during a performance task. Cardiovascular responses indicated that the 
task was experienced as a challenge after receiving a group-affirmation, thereby 
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showing that highly identified group members felt able to cope with the task, while the 
task was experienced as a threat – situational demands were perceived to tax or exceed 
personal resources – after the individual self was affirmed (Derks et al., 2011). It was 
suggested that highly identified group members are concerned about the effects of 
stereotype threat to the value of their group (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 
1999), which can be restored by affirming their social identity. No significant 
differences between self-affirmation and group-affirmation were found among low 
identified group members. 
Justifying the wrongdoings of the ingroup 
While research has indicated that group-affirmation is effective in reducing 
defensive biases towards group-performance threats among people for whom the group 
is strongly linked to their self-definition (Derks et al., 2011; Derks et al., 2009; Sherman 
et al., 2007), little is known about the impact of group identification on the effectiveness 
of group-affirmation in comparison to self-affirmation in enhancing the 
acknowledgement of an ingroups’ moral wrongdoings. Even though in-group 
competence can function as a status-defining feature (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & 
Hume, 2001), it has been demonstrated that ingroup morality is a more important 
characteristic for positive ingroup evaluation (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Van 
Prooijen, Ellemers, Van der Lee, & Scheepers, in prep.). Additionally, judgments about 
competence are more open to improvement and less fixed than are judgments about 
morality, as positive information about competence is seen as more diagnostic and 
decisive than negative information, whereas these perceptions are reversed for morality 
judgments (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987).  It is therefore likely that collective threats 
that involve performance judgments pose a different type of threat than collective 
threats that involve moral judgments about one’s ingroup, which in turn may potentially 
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affect group-affirmation effectiveness. Although group-affirmation can attenuate 
defensiveness towards group performance threats by restoring the collective self (Derks 
et al., 2011; Derks et al., 2009; Sherman et al., 2007), it might be more challenging to 
protect the collective self from a threat to group morality, as a judgment about the 
groups’ immorality is more defining than a judgment about the groups’ incompetence 
(Wojciszke, 2005). In support of this line of reasoning, research has shown that self-
affirmation was a more effective strategy to increase the acknowledgement of a nation’s 
negative past behaviour in an intergroup conflict than was group-affirmation (Čehajić-
Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011).  
In the present study I aimed to extend prior research by examining how group 
identification can potentially lead to detrimental effects of group-affirmation on the 
justification of the actions of one’s group that may cause harm to other people. Group 
membership is likely to be a more important aspect of the self-definition for people who 
highly identify with their group. By affirming an aspect of the self-concept that is 
defined by group membership, the cognitive salience of the collective self is increased 
(Derks et al., 2009). Focus of attention on the collective self has been shown to promote 
larger perceived differences between the ingroup and the outgroup (Skinner & 
Stephenson, 1981), enhance biased group evaluation (Hong & Harrod, 1988; Mullen, 
Brown, & Smith, 1992), and increase the blame attributed to people who were victims 
of wrongdoings (Van Prooijen & Van den Bos, 2009). Furthermore, ingroup pride is 
heightened by group-affirmation manipulations (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2011; Miron et 
al., 2010), which in turn has been associated with stronger outgroup derogation 
(Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Wann & Grieve, 2005).  
When there is a stronger link between the self-definition and group membership, 
negative information concerning the ingroup’s morality is likely to be more threatening 
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to the self-concept and to evoke defensive biases than when group membership is not an 
important part of the self-image. I propose that affirming the collective self may 
enhance group biases in response to threats to group morality when group identification 
is high. That is, highlighting group membership through group-affirmation when facing 
actions conducted by the group that can be perceived as immoral may promote 
defensive responses, as the importance of the group to the self-concept is more salient. 
However, enhancing the individual self-image through self-affirmation may attenuate 
the need to defend the group, as an alternative source of self-worth that is unrelated to 
the group has been boosted.     
The present study 
In the present study I focus on UK greenhouse gas emissions and their impact on 
global climate change problems. Climate change can present a collective threat for 
which multiple countries can be held accountable. As people often perceive the amount 
of nonsustainable resources used by their nation and the national emissions of 
greenhouse gases as lower than that of other nations, the involvement of their nation in 
climate change problems tends to be justified or rejected (Norgaard, 2006; Opotow & 
Weiss, 2000). Perceived inequality in resource dilemmas between groups has been 
shown to lead to a reduction in cooperation and can function as a reason for groups to 
reject prosocial behavioural change (Aquino, Steisel, & Kay, 1992), which can have 
severe consequences for the mitigation of climate change. The nations which produce 
large amounts of greenhouse gases often have the financial capacity to take protective 
measures against potential climate change consequences. However, the disruption of the 
climate system is likely to be felt the most by people in developing countries, who emit 
low amounts of greenhouse gases and who cannot financially invest in mitigation 
actions (IPCC, 2007b). Climate change can therefore be perceived as a moral issue, as 
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the implications of substantial greenhouse gas emissions can cause harm among people 
who are hardly responsible for the problem (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006).  
Whereas group-affirmation has more beneficial effects than self-affirmation for 
highly identified group members in contexts where group competence is threatened 
(Derks et al., 2011; Derks et al., 2009; Sherman et al., 2007), little is known about the 
moderating role of group identification on the different effects of group-affirmation and 
self-affirmation in contexts where group morality is threatened. I aim to test whether 
group-affirmation can evoke stronger group biases and a stronger rejection of the moral 
value of pro-environmental behaviour in response to a collective morality-related threat 
than self-affirmation depending on group identification. I suggest that for highly 
identified UK citizens, the salience of the collective self and the strengthening of their 
national pride through group-affirmation may make the threat to their nation more self-
relevant. In contrast, low identified UK citizens are unlikely to perceive the threat to 
their nation as relevant to the self, as their nationality is not closely linked to their self-
definition. I therefore expected that group-affirmation will promote a stronger need to 
justify the contribution of one’s nation to a global problem and lower moral judgment 
about pro-environmental behaviour than self-affirmation among high identifiers, while 
low identifiers will not be affected by the type of affirmation. 
Additionally, I have included ecological worldviews as a potential moderator in 
the current study, as previous research has shown that initial environmental beliefs can 
influence self-affirmation effects in a climate change context (Van Prooijen & Sparks, 
2012; Van Prooijen, Sparks, & Jessop, in press). People with negative ecological 
worldviews, who tend to have low environmental concern and who are often sceptical 
about the human impact on climate change, are likely to reject anthropogenic climate 
change information due to the discrepancy between their beliefs and the evidence 
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presented in the information. In contrast, people with positive ecological worldviews, 
who have high environmental concern, are likely to be less resistant to anthropogenic 
climate change information due to their acceptance of the human impact on 
environmental problems. I therefore predicted that the differences between group-
affirmation and self-affirmation effects on the need to justify the UK’s contribution to 
climate change would only be apparent among people with negative ecological 
worldviews. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 151 (119 females; 32 males) students with UK nationality. 
Their ages ranged from 18 years to 45 years (M = 21.26, SD = 5.26). Participants who 
completed the study were automatically included in a prize draw in which they had a 
chance of winning £100.  
Design and procedure 
Participants were invited via email to complete two online questionnaires. The 
first questionnaire functioned as a pretest in which ecological worldviews and national 
identification were assessed. One week after completion of the first questionnaire a link 
to the second questionnaire was sent to participants. Participants were sequentially 
assigned to the group-affirmation or the self-affirmation condition.
1
 Following the 
affirmation manipulation, the information about climate change and the outcome 
measures were introduced to the participants as an unrelated study.   
Materials 
All measures were assessed with Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). A definition of a carbon footprint was provided before 
the outcome measures were presented.  
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Ecological worldviews. Ecological worldviews were assessed with the revised 
New Ecological Paradigm scale (NEP; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000), 
which consisted of 15 items (e.g. “The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind 
has been greatly exaggerated”, α = .77). 
National identification. Three items that were adapted from Branscombe, 
Schmitt, and Schiffhauer (2007) were used to measure national identification (e.g. “I am 
not embarrassed to admit that I am a UK citizen”, α = .86).  
Affirmation manipulation. The affirmation manipulation was adapted from 
Čehajić-Clancy et al. (2011, Study 2). Participants in the group-affirmation condition (n 
= 72)
2
 were asked to describe an achievement of the UK, how this achievement made 
them feel as a UK citizen, and what this achievement reflects about the UK. Participants 
in the self-affirmation condition (n = 79) were asked to describe a personal achievement 
in their life, how this achievement made them feel, and what this achievement reflects 
about them.   
Climate change information. The participants read a short text about the 
impact of greenhouse gases that are generated by human activity on climate change, the 
influence of climate change on poorer countries, the difference in greenhouse gas 
emissions between poorer countries and the UK, and the substantial contribution of the 
UK to climate change due to a strong overproduction of greenhouse gases. 
Outgroup blame. Outgroup blame was measured with four items (e.g. “Most 
other western countries are more to blame for climate change than is the UK”, α = .76). 
Rejection of consequences. Rejection of the consequences of the UK’s carbon 
emissions on developing countries was assessed with three items (e.g. “The harmful 
effects of the UK’s carbon emissions on poor countries are exaggerated”, α = .79). 
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Moral judgment. Two items from Van Prooijen et al. (2012) were used to 
measure moral judgment about pro-environmental behaviour:  “It seems ethical to me to 
adjust one’s lifestyle in order to protect the earth” and “Trying to reduce your carbon 
footprint is the right thing to do”, r (149) = .75, p < .001. 
Group-efficacy. Three items (adapted from Van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 
2010) were used to assess group-efficacy with regard to reducing the consequences of 
climate change (e.g. “UK citizens can jointly reduce the negative consequences of 
climate change”, α = .89). 
Results 
The outcome measures were analyzed with hierarchical regression analyses. 
Affirmation (1 = group-affirmation vs. 0 = self-affirmation) was entered as a main 
effect in Step 1, together with the mean-centred continuous variables national 
identification and ecological worldviews. The three two-way interactions between 
affirmation, national identification, and ecological worldviews were entered in Step 2. 
The three-way interaction between affirmation, national identification, and ecological 
worldviews was entered in Step 3. Significant three-way interactions were probed by 
examining the simple slopes of each outcome measure on affirmation for participants 
with low (- 1 SD) or high (+ 1 SD) national identification in combination with negative 
(- 1 SD) or positive (+ 1 SD) ecological worldviews (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006).      
Outgroup blame. A main effect of ecological worldviews on outgroup blame 
was found, β = -.35, SE = .17, p = .001, semipartial R2 = .06, as well as a marginal 
interaction between affirmation and national identification, β =.22, SE = .17, p = .06, 
semipartial R
2
 = .02, and an interaction between national identification and ecological 
worldviews, β = .20, SE = .13, p = .05, semipartial R2 = .02. These effects were 
qualified by a three-way interaction between affirmation, national identification, and  
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ecological worldviews, β = -.30, SE = .20, p = .01, semipartial R2 = .04 (see Figure 9). 
Highly identified participants with negative ecological worldviews reported more 
outgroup blame in the group-affirmation condition than in the self-affirmation 
condition, β = .34, SE = .31, p = .01, while low identified participants with negative 
ecological worldviews reported marginally more outgroup blame in the self-affirmation 
condition than in the group-affirmation condition, β = -.43, SE = .53, p = .07. No effects 
were found among participants with positive ecological worldviews, p > .16. 
Rejection of consequences. The analysis revealed a main effect of ecological 
worldviews on rejection of consequences, β = -.27, SE = .18, p = .01, semipartial R2 = 
.04, and an interaction between national identification and ecological worldviews, β = 
.25, SE = .14, p = .02, semipartial R
2
 = .03, which were qualified by a three-way 
interaction between affirmation, national identification, and ecological worldviews, β = 
-.30, SE = .22, p = .01, semipartial R
2
 = .04 (see Figure 10). Simple slopes analyses 
showed that highly identified participants with negative ecological worldviews were 
more inclined to reject the impact of climate change consequences on developing 
countries in the group-affirmation condition than in the self-affirmation condition, β = 
.27, SE = .32, p = .04. A marginal effect emerged among low identified participants 
with negative ecological worldviews, in which rejection of consequences was 
negatively influenced by self-affirmation in comparison to group-affirmation, β = -.38, 
SE = .56, p = .10. Affirmation had no effect on positive ecological worldview 
participants, p > .50. 
Moral judgment. Moral judgment of pro-environmental behaviour was 
influenced by main effects of ecological worldviews, β = .25, SE = .13, p = .01, 
semipartial R
2
 = .03, and national identification, β = .25, SE = .07, p = .009, semipartial 
R
2
 = .03. These main effects were qualified by an interaction between affirmation and 
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ecological worldviews, β = .22, SE = .20, p = .05, semipartial R2 = .02, a marginal 
interaction between affirmation and national identification, β = -.18, SE = .13, p = .09, 
semipartial R
2
 = .01, and an interaction between ecological worldviews and national 
identification, β = -.22, SE = .10, p = .03, semipartial R2 = .02. Furthermore, as 
predicted, a three-way interaction between affirmation, national identification, and 
ecological worldviews was found, β = .29, SE = .16, p = .01, semipartial R2 = .03 (see 
Figure 11). Highly identified participants with negative ecological worldviews reported 
lower pro-environmental moral judgment in the group-affirmation condition than in the 
self-affirmation condition, β = -.62, SE = .23, p < .001. None of the other simple slopes 
were significant, p > .53. 
Group-efficacy. The analysis yielded a marginal main effect of national 
identification on group-efficacy, β = .17, SE = .09, p = .09, semipartial R2 = .02, and an 
interaction between national identification and ecological worldviews, β = -.32, SE = 
.14, p = .003, semipartial R
2
 = .05, which were qualified by a three-way interaction 
between affirmation, national identification, and ecological worldviews, β = .42, SE = 
.21, p = .001, semipartial R
2
 = .07 (see Figure 12). The belief in group-efficacy 
regarding reducing the consequences of climate change was less strong in the group-
affirmation condition than in the self-affirmation condition among highly identified 
participants with negative ecological worldviews, β = -.64, SE = .31, p < .001. No 
effects of affirmation were found among the other participants, p > .19. 
Discussion 
While group-affirmation has been shown to be effective in reducing defensive 
biases towards collective performance-related threats among highly identified people 
(Derks et al., 2011; Derks et al., 2009; Sherman et al., 2007), it has not been examined 
how group identification may moderate group-affirmation effects when people are 
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confronted with collective morality-related threats. As morality has been shown to be a 
more important group characteristic than competence for a positive group evaluation 
(Leach et al., 2007; Van Prooijen et al., in prep.) and as a negative judgment about 
morality is more stable and difficult to change than a negative judgment about 
competence (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987; Wojciszke, 2005), it is likely that a 
collective competence threat might be less threatening to people who highly identify 
with their group than is a collective morality threat, which may influence the 
effectiveness of affirmation manipulations. In the current study I compared group-
affirmation effects to self-affirmation effects on defensive biases towards the acceptance 
of the national contribution to climate change problems in developing countries, and I 
investigated how national identification and ecological worldviews moderated these 
effects. Previous research has shown that group-affirmation tends to result in higher 
levels of ingroup pride and higher salience of the collective self (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 
2011; Derks et al., 2009; Miron et al., 2010), which in turn have both been associated 
with increased group biases (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Mullen et al., 1992; Wann & 
Grieve, 2005). I hypothesized that a group-affirmation should promote a stronger need 
to justify group actions and a stronger rejection of the moral value of pro-environmental 
behaviour than self-affirmation among highly identified people, as the group-
affirmation may increase the self-relevance of the collective threat. In contrast, I 
hypothesized that no differences between group-affirmation and self-affirmation would 
be found among low identified people, as the threat is likely to be perceived as 
irrelevant to the self-definition. Finally, I hypothesized that only people with negative 
ecological worldviews would respond defensively to climate change information, which 
would result in differences between group-affirmation and self-affirmation only among 
this group.  
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In support of my predictions, it was found that group-affirmation led to a greater 
need to justify the national contribution to climate change than did self-affirmation 
among highly identified participants with negative ecological worldviews; in 
comparison to self-affirmation, group-affirmation promoted the attribution of blame for 
climate change to other nations, more rejection of the consequences of climate change 
for developing countries, lower moral judgment about pro-environmental behaviour, 
and less group-efficacy with regard to mitigating climate change consequences. Low 
identified participants with negative ecological worldviews reported marginally lower 
outgroup blame and rejection of climate change consequences after group-affirmation 
than after self-affirmation. A possible explanation for these findings might be that, as 
group membership is not strongly linked to the self-image, the collective threat might 
not activate a threat to the self for low identifiers, which may reduce the effectiveness of 
affirming the individual self. Whereas the salience of the group appears to enhance 
defensive biases against collective morality threats among highly identified people, a 
group-affirmation may actually boost the collective self without increasing the 
motivation to protect the positive group-image among low identifiers. I also found that, 
consistent with prior research (Van Prooijen et al., in press; Van Prooijen & Sparks, 
2012), ecological worldviews were a significant moderator of affirmation effects. The 
differences between group-affirmation and self-affirmation were only apparent among 
participants with negative ecological worldviews, who are likely to be resistant towards 
climate change information.   
The present research suggests that the effectiveness of group-affirmation in 
comparison to self-affirmation in the context of a collective threat does not only depend 
on group identification, but that it is also important to distinguish whether a collective 
threat is related to morality or competence characteristics of the ingroup. Whereas 
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group-affirmation has been shown to be a better coping strategy than self-affirmation 
for highly identified people when faced with a collective competence-related threat 
(Derks et al., 2011; Derks et al., 2009; Sherman et al., 2007), my findings indicate that 
this effect is reversed when people are confronted with a threat that could jeopardize the 
moral image of the ingroup. I thereby extended prior research that demonstrated that 
self-affirmation led to more acknowledgment of the ingroup’s wrongdoings in an 
intergroup conflict than did group-affirmation (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2011) by showing 
that these effects were limited to people who highly identify with the group.  
There are several limitations of the current study that need to be addressed. First, 
I did not include an established control condition in the design. Although my main aim 
was to examine the differences between group-affirmation and self-affirmation, more 
research is needed to determine whether group-affirmation increases group biases or 
whether group-affirmation has no effects on group biases among high identifiers. 
Second, it should be noted that I did not directly compare group-affirmation effects on 
collective morality-related threats with group-affirmation effects on collective 
competence-related threats. While the findings on the moderating role of identification 
on group-affirmation effects in a collective morality-related threat context clearly show 
an opposite pattern from the effects found in a context with a collective performance-
related threat (Derks et al., 2011; Derks et al., 2009; Sherman et al., 2007), and while 
these findings are in line with earlier findings of group-affirmation effects on responses 
to a collective morality-related threat (Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2011), further research in 
which threats to group morality are compared with threats to group competence would 
enable us to directly establish whether the type of threat influences affirmation effects. 
Group-affirmation has been shown to be a useful strategy to cope with collective 
threats by reducing defensive biases (Derks et al., 2011; Derks et al., 2009; Sherman et 
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al., 2007). However, even though boosting the collective self has beneficial effects, it is 
useful to consider the negative consequences that have been associated with the salience 
of group-identity, such as increase in group biases (Mullen et al., 1992). My findings 
show that, when information that can challenge the morality of the group is presented to 
people for whom group membership is important to the self-image, self-affirmation is a 
better coping strategy to decrease defensive biases that stem from the need to protect the 
positive group-image than is group-affirmation.     
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Footnotes 
1
 The design originally included a control condition (adapted from Jordan, 
Mullen, and Murnighan, 2011, Study 2), in which participants were asked to describe 
what they usually do on a typical Tuesday. No differences between the control 
condition and the affirmation conditions were found on the outcome measures. 
However, I suspect that summing up what someone usually does on a typical Tuesday 
may unintentionally provide a sense of achievement, which could have confounded the 
effects of the affirmation manipulation and which might imply that the control condition 
was not a neutral task. Additionally, it should be noted that Jordan et al. did not use the 
task in the context of a self-affirmation study, and the control condition has never been 
used as an established manipulation within self-affirmation literature. The data from the 
control condition are therefore not discussed here. 
2
 Originally 76 participants completed the group-affirmation condition. 
However, four participants were excluded from data-analysis as they did not follow the 
instructions given in the manipulation. Three participants reported failures of the UK, 
and one participant did not provide an answer. The exclusion of these participants did 
not significantly change the findings.   
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Figures 
 
Figure 9. Outgroup blame regressed onto national identification and ecological 
worldviews, by affirmation. 
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Figure 10. Rejection of consequences regressed onto national identification and 
ecological worldviews, by affirmation. 
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Figure 11. Moral judgment regressed onto national identification and ecological 
worldviews, by affirmation. 
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Figure 12. Group-efficacy regressed onto national identification and ecological 
worldviews, by affirmation. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Materials Used in Chapter 2 
 
147 
 
Pretest Measure (Study 2 and Study 3) 
 
Possibility of an ecological crisis items 
Humans are severely abusing the environment (reversed scored). 
The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated. 
If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological 
catastrophe (reversed scored).
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Affirmation Manipulation (Study 1 and Study 2) 
 
Kindness-affirmation condition 
The following questions are designed to measure level of kindness toward others. These 
questions refer to behaviours that YOU have performed for other people. As you read 
each question, please try to recall a time when YOU performed each behaviour for 
another person. There are no right or wrong answers, so please be as honest as possible. 
Please tick the box next to the answer that best describes your behaviour toward other 
people. If you answer YES to any of the questions, please provide a short example of 
the last time you performed this behaviour. 
 
1. Have you ever forgiven another person when they have hurt you? 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, example: 
 
2. Have you ever been considerate of another person’s feelings? 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, example: 
 
3. Have you ever been concerned with the happiness of another person? 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, example: 
 
4. Have you ever looked out for another person’s interests before your own? 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, example: 
 
5. Have you ever been generous and selfless to another person? 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, example: 
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6. Have you ever attended to the needs of another person? 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, example: 
 
7. Have you ever tried not to hurt the feelings of another person? 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, example: 
 
8. Have you ever felt satisfied when you’ve helped another person? 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, example: 
 
9. Have you ever gone out of your way to help a friend even at the expense of your own 
happiness? 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, example: 
 
10. Have you ever found ways to help another person who was less fortunate than 
yourself? 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, example: 
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Affirmation Manipulation (Study 1 and Study 2) 
 
Control condition 
The following questions are designed to measure personal opinions. These questions 
refer to YOUR opinions on each topic. There are no right or wrong answers, so please 
be as honest as possible. Please tick the box next to the answer that best describes 
YOUR opinion. If you answer YES to any of the questions, please provide a reason why 
you believe this statement to be true. 
 
1. I think that the colour blue looks great on most people. 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, why? 
 
2. I think that chocolate is the best flavour for ice cream. 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, why? 
 
3. I think that winter is the most satisfying season during the year. 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, why? 
 
4. I think that the most aromatic trees in the world are pine trees. 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, why? 
 
5. I think that cooking is an important skill to possess. 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, why? 
 
6. I think that house plants help to brighten a home. 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, why? 
 
151 
 
7. I think that sewing is an important skill to possess. 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, why? 
 
8. I think that the beach is a great place to vacation. 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, why? 
 
9. I think that the subway is the best form of public transportation. 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, why? 
 
10. I think that fruit makes the best dessert. 
Yes □    No □ 
 If Yes, why? 
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Affirmation Manipulation (Study 3) 
 
Value-affirmation condition 
In the present study we are interested in investigating people’s values. By values we 
mean the principles and standards by which people try to live their lives. For example, 
honesty might be a core value for some people. That is, they may try to be honest in all 
they do – whether in dealing with other people or working. Following are some personal 
values that people have described as important to them. 
 
Altruism  Spontaneity  Forgiveness  Loyalty 
Honesty  Goodness  Religiousness  Tolerance  
Creativity   Sincerity   Fairness   Resourcefulness 
 
Please select the value from the list above that is most important to you, and write it in 
the space provided. If more than one value is equally important to you then please select 
just one to write about. 
 
The most important value to me is:………………………….............. 
 
In the space below please write a short statement (around 2-3 sentences) about why this 
value is important to you. Take a couple of minutes to think about this value and how 
this value has influenced things that you have done. Please write about how you use this 
value in your everyday life. 
 
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................. 
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Affirmation Manipulation (Study 3) 
 
Control condition 
In the present study we are interested in investigating people’s values. By values we 
mean the principles and standards by which people try to live their lives. For example, 
honesty might be a core value for some people. That is, they may try to be honest in all 
they do – whether in dealing with other people or working. Following are some personal 
values that people have described as important to them. 
 
Altruism  Spontaneity  Forgiveness  Loyalty 
Honesty  Goodness  Religiousness  Tolerance  
Creativity   Sincerity   Fairness   Resourcefulness 
 
Please select the value from the list above that is least important to you, and write it in 
the space provided.  
  
The least important value to me is:………………………….............. 
 
In the space below please write a short statement (around 2-3 sentences) about why this 
value might be important to someone else, and how this value might influence their 
everyday life.  
 
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................... .......
............................................................................................................................ ................. 
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Climate Change Information (Study 1, Study 2 and Study 3) 
 
Climate change refers to the variation in the Earth’s climate over a period of time. It has 
recently been widely acknowledged that human action has had a significant effect on 
the change of climate in modern times. 
 
Please read the following statements about climate change, taken from a variety of 
sources and answer briefly the questions below each statement. 
“The evidence is there. The damage is being done. What do we, the international 
community, do about it? In some areas, the action required is primarily for individual 
nations to take. But the problem of global climate change is one that affects us all and 
action will only be effective if it is taken at the international level. It is no good 
squabbling over who is responsible or who should pay. We have to look forward not 
backward, and we shall only succeed in dealing with the problems through a vast 
international, co-operative effort”    Extract from a speech by Margaret Thatcher to the 
United Nations, 8
th
 November, 1989 
A) Who does the author suggest will be affected by climate change? 
 
“We have to confront this threat…Unfortunately the media all too often does this in a 
way that relegates the most important issue facing our species as if it was a soccer 
match between two competing sides of equal strength. It’s not. If you want to compare 
it (the debate over the existence of global warming) to a football match, it is more like 
Manchester United taking on three primary school children. It is as ridiculous as 
that…..On one hand, you have the entire scientific community and on the other you 
have a handful of people, half of them crackpots. Nevertheless, this is still presented as 
an unresolved battle. That is simply not true. It has been resolved. Only the details of 
climatic change’s impact have still to be worked out”.    Robert May, President of the 
Royal Society, on Climate Change 
B) What does the author suggest is the only thing still to be worked out? 
 
“In my view, climate change is the most severe problem we are facing today, more 
serious even than the threat of terrorism…” 
Sir David King, the UK government chief scientist, BBC News, Wednesday 31 March 
2004, 03.16 GMT 04.16 UK 
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“So asking wealthy people in the rich nations to act to prevent climate change means 
asking them to give up many of the things they value - their high performance cars, their 
flights to Tuscany and Thailand and Florida - for the benefit of other people…The 
problem is compounded by the fact that the connection between cause and effect seems 
so improbable. By turning on the lights, filling the kettle, taking the children to school, 
driving to the shops, we are condemning other people to death. We never choose to do 
this. We do not see ourselves as killers. We perform these acts without passion or 
intent.”       George Monbiot, 2006 
C) According to this author, preventing climate change requires people to do what 
exactly?  
 
“Deadly it may be, but when we pass the threshold of climate change there may be 
nothing perceptible to mark this crucial step, nothing to warn that there is no 
returning…Humanity, wholly unprepared by its humanist traditions, faces its greatest 
trial. The acceleration of the climate change now under way will sweep away the 
comfortable environment to which we are adapted…Why are we so slow…to see the 
great peril that faces us and civilization? What stops us from realizing that the fever of 
global heating is real and deadly and might already have moved outside our and the 
Earth’s control?    James Lovelock,  The Revenge of Gaia, 2006 
D) What does this author suggest that climate change will sweep away? 
 
“…I am not the sandal-wearing fanatic of sceptic legend, wishing my dismal life-style 
on everyone else. I burn coal fires in winter, I’m off to New Zealand this year, and I 
estimate my home has a hundred electric light bulbs, though they’re not all on at once. 
That’s why I don’t hold out much hope. Having been convinced that global warming is 
a genuine threat, I still think, deep down, that you only live once and my own carbon 
footprint won’t make much of a difference. Which is just what everyone else thinks”      
Peter Wilby, 2007 
E) Why does this author not hold out much hope? 
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Manipulation Check Measures (Study 1) 
 
Self-feelings item 
How do you feel about yourself right now? 
 
Mood item 
How would you describe your mood right now? 
 
Kindness item 
How kind do you consider yourself to be? 
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Outcome Measures 
 
Climate change scepticism items (Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3) 
Climate change is too complex and uncertain for scientists to make useful forecasts. 
Claims that human activities are changing the climate are exaggerated. 
I do not believe climate change is a real problem. 
Floods and heat-waves are not increasing, there is just more reporting of it in the media 
these days. 
The media is often too alarmist about issues like climate change. 
Climate change is just a natural fluctuation in earth’s temperatures. 
There is too much conflicting evidence about climate change to know whether it is 
actually happening. 
I am uncertain about whether climate change is really happening. 
Many leading experts still question if human activity is contributing to climate change. 
Too much fuss is made about climate change. 
The evidence for climate change is unreliable. 
It is too early to say whether climate change is really a problem. 
Talking about climate change is boring. 
 
Commitment to protect the environment items (Study 1) 
I feel a strong commitment to being environmentally conscious. 
The global warming problem truly concerns me.  
I feel 'emotionally engaged' with environmental issues. 
I believe that people don’t care enough about global warming. 
It seems ethical to me to adjust one’s lifestyle in small ways in order to act more 
responsibly for the planet. 
I believe being environmentally conscious is a moral obligation. 
 
Message derogation items (Study 2 and Study 3) 
I thought the information about climate change was overblown. 
I thought the information about climate change was exaggerated. 
I thought the information about climate change tried to manipulate my feelings. 
I thought the information about climate change tried to strain the truth. 
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Pretest Measure 
 
New Ecological Paradigm items 
We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support. 
Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs (reversed 
scored). 
When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences. 
Human ingenuity will insure that we do NOT make the earth unliveable (reversed 
scored). 
Humans are severely abusing the environment. 
The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them (reversed 
scored). 
Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist. 
The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial 
nations (reversed scored). 
Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws of nature. 
The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated 
(reversed scored). 
The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources. 
Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature (reversed scored). 
The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset. 
Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it 
(reversed scored). 
If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological 
catastrophe. 
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Affirmation Manipulation  
 
Affirmation condition 
In the present study we are interested in investigating people’s values. By values we 
mean the principles and standards by which people try to live their lives. For example, 
honesty might be a core value for some people. That is, they may try to be honest in all 
they do – whether in dealing with other people or working. Following are some personal 
values that people have described as important to them. 
 
Altruism   Fairness    Forgiveness 
Goodness   Honesty     Kindness  
Loyalty    Sincerity     Tolerance 
 
Please select the value from the list above that is most important to you, and write it in 
the space provided. If more than one value is equally important to you then please select 
just one to write about. 
 
The most important value to me is:………………………….............. 
 
In the space below please write a short statement (around 2-3 sentences) about why this 
value is important to you. Take a couple of minutes to think about this value and how 
this value has influenced things that you have done. Please write about how you use this 
value in your everyday life.  
 
Control condition 
In the present study we are interested in investigating people’s general eating and 
drinking habits. Please try to write down everything that you have eaten or drunk in the 
past 48 hours. There is no need to worry about those things you find yourself unable to 
remember! 
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Definition Carbon Footprint 
 
In some of the following questions we will ask you about your carbon footprint. A 
carbon footprint is the sum of all emissions of CO2 (carbon dioxide), which were 
induced by your activities in a given time frame.  
 
A  low carbon footprint is an indication of an environmentally friendly lifestyle. 
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Outcome Measures 
 
Moral judgment items 
It seems ethical to me to adjust one’s lifestyle in order to protect the earth. 
Trying to reduce my carbon footprint is the right thing to do. 
 
Perceived effort required to reduce carbon footprint items 
I would need to carefully prepare a change in my lifestyle if I wanted to reduce my 
carbon footprint. 
It would take much effort to reduce my carbon footprint. 
It would be a challenge for me to reduce my carbon footprint. 
I would need to make a significant commitment in order to reduce my carbon footprint. 
It would require a significant change in my behaviour for me to reduce my carbon 
footprint substantially. 
 
Self-efficacy items 
There are simple things I can do that contribute to preventing the negative consequences 
of climate change. 
I can change my daily routines to help combat climate change. 
There are things I can do that can make a difference in preventing the negative 
consequences of climate change. 
My individual actions will make a contribution to a solution of the climate change 
problem. 
Changes in my daily routines will make a contribution to preventing the negative 
consequences of climate change. 
 
Pro-environmental intentions items 
I intend to reduce my carbon footprint from now on. 
I shall try to reduce my carbon footprint from now on. 
I shall make an effort to reduce my carbon footprint from now on. 
I intend to behave more environmentally friendly from now on. 
I shall try to behave more environmentally friendly from now on. 
I shall make an effort to behave more environmentally friendly from now on. 
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Pretest Measure 
 
Fragility of nature’s balance items 
When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences. 
The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial 
nations (reversed scored). 
The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset. 
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Affirmation Manipulation  
 
Affirmation condition 
In the present study we are interested in investigating people’s values. By values we 
mean the principles and standards by which people try to live their lives. For example, 
honesty might be a core value for some people. That is, they may try to be honest in all 
they do – whether in dealing with other people or working. Following are some personal 
values that people have described as important to them. 
 
Altruism   Fairness    Forgiveness 
Goodness   Honesty     Kindness  
Loyalty    Sincerity     Tolerance 
 
Please select the value from the list above that is most important to you, and write it in 
the space provided. If more than one value is equally important to you then please select 
just one to write about. 
 
The most important value to me is:………………………….............. 
 
In the space below please write a short statement (around 2-3 sentences) about why this 
value is important to you. Take a couple of minutes to think about this value and how 
this value has influenced things that you have done. Please write about how you use this 
value in your everyday life.  
 
Control condition 
In the present study we are interested in investigating people’s general eating and 
drinking habits. Please try to write down everything that you have eaten or drunk in the 
past 48 hours. There is no need to worry about those things you find yourself unable to 
remember! 
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Climate Change Information 
 
During the twentieth century, the earth’s surface warmed by about 0.74° C, according to 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Science has made great strides 
in determining the potential causes for that change. The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment 
Reports in 2007 stated that warming of the climate system is “unequivocal” and that 
most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-twentieth 
century is “very likely” due to the rise in greenhouse gases generated by human activity. 
 
The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report observed that between 1970 and 2004, 
greenhouse gas emissions increased by 70 per cent, and carbon dioxide (CO2) – by far 
the largest source with 77 per cent of total emissions – grew by about 80 per cent. 
Atmospheric concentrations of CO2, methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N20), the IPCC 
found, had risen markedly since 1750 due to human activity, and today, far exceed pre-
industrial values. 
 
Projections indicate that if emissions are allowed to rise at their current pace and double 
from pre-industrial levels, the world would likely face a 2° - 4.5° C temperature rise by 
2100, with a 3°C increase most likely. 
 
There is near universal acceptance that complete avoidance of climate change is now 
impossible and that adaptive capacity needs to be improved everywhere, including in 
high-income countries. Disruption in the climate system is manifesting itself around the 
world through more frequent floods, droughts and heat waves whose severity will only 
increase. A wide range of adaptation options is available, including disaster risk 
reduction efforts, insurance and other risk transfer mechanisms. Their widespread use is 
needed to reduce the vulnerability of high-risk communities to inevitable climate 
impacts. 
 
Under the IPCC’s most stringent emissions reduction scenario, the world has a 50 per 
cent chance of limiting further temperature increases to 2° C. Achieving that would 
require a comprehensive global mitigation effort, including a further tightening of 
existing climate policies in developed countries and concurrent emissions reductions in 
developing nations. In other words, the world would need to see an emissions peak 
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before 2020 and a 50 per cent reduction below 1990 levels by 2050. For industrialized 
nations, that translates to a 25-40 per cent emissions reduction below 1990 levels by 
2020. 
 
The impacts associated with such a scenario are serious but widely regarded as more 
manageable if a risk reduction approach is fully embraced. However, without action, 
there is overwhelming scientific evidence that climate change will threaten economic 
growth and survival of the world’s most vulnerable populations: 
 
 By 2020, some 75 to 250 million people in Africa will face increased water  
shortages. Yields from rain-fed agriculture (dominant method) could fall by up to 50 per 
cent in some African countries. 
 About 20-30 per cent of plant and animal species will likely face increased risk  
of extinction if global average temperature increases exceed 1.5°-2.5° C. 
 Widespread melting of glaciers and snow cover will create risk of flash floods  
and, over time, reduce annual melt water from major mountain ranges (i.e.: Hindu-
Kush, Himalaya, Andes), where more than one billion people live. 
 Seven of ten disasters are now climate-related. 
 More than 20 million people were displaced by sudden climate-related disasters  
in 2008 alone. An estimated 200 million could be displaced as a result of climate 
impacts by 2050. 
 
Sources: IPCC, UN, Stern Review 2006  
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Definition Carbon Footprint 
 
In some of the following questions we will ask you about your carbon footprint. A 
carbon footprint is the sum of all emissions of CO2 (carbon dioxide), which were 
induced by your activities in a given time frame.  
 
A  low carbon footprint is an indication of an environmentally friendly lifestyle. 
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Outcome Measures 
 
Perceptions of global consequences items 
I think that it is likely that there will be water shortages worldwide due to climate 
change in the next 50 years if carbon emissions are not significantly reduced. 
I think that it is likely that there will be an increase in rates of disease worldwide due to 
climate change in the next 50 years if carbon emissions are not significantly reduced. 
I think that it is likely that there will be a decrease in standards of living worldwide due 
to climate change in the next 50 years if carbon emissions are not significantly reduced. 
 
Perceptions of national consequences items 
I think that it is likely that there will be water shortages in the UK due to climate change 
in the next 50 years if carbon emissions are not significantly reduced. 
I think that it is likely that there will be an increased rate of disease in the UK due to 
climate change in the next 50 years if carbon emissions are not significantly reduced. 
I think that it is likely that there will be a decreased standard of living in the UK due to 
climate change in the next 50 years if carbon emissions are not significantly reduced. 
 
Self-efficacy items 
There are simple things I can do that contribute to preventing the negative consequences 
of climate change. 
There are things I can do that can make a difference in preventing the negative 
consequences of climate change. 
My individual actions will make a contribution to a solution of the climate change 
problem. 
Changes in my daily routines will make a contribution to preventing the negative 
consequences of climate change. 
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Outcome Measures 
 
Pessimism items 
When I read the information pages, I felt hopeless.  
When I read the information pages, I felt a general feeling of pessimism. 
When I read the information pages, I felt a sense of futility. 
When I read the information pages, I felt helpless. 
  
Pro-environmental intentions items 
I intend to reduce my carbon footprint from now on. 
I shall try to reduce my carbon footprint from now on. 
I shall make an effort to reduce my carbon footprint from now on. 
I intend to behave more environmentally friendly from now on. 
I shall try to behave more environmentally friendly from now on. 
I shall make an effort to behave more environmentally friendly from now on. 
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Pretest Measures 
 
New Ecological Paradigm items 
We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support. 
Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs (reversed 
scored). 
When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences. 
Human ingenuity will insure that we do NOT make the earth unliveable (reversed 
scored). 
Humans are severely abusing the environment. 
The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them (reversed 
scored). 
Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist. 
The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial 
nations (reversed scored). 
Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws of nature. 
The so-called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated 
(reversed scored). 
The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources. 
Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature (reversed scored). 
The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset. 
Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it 
(reversed scored). 
If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological 
catastrophe. 
 
National identification items 
I believe that UK citizens have a lot to be proud of. 
I am not embarrassed to admit that I am a UK citizen. 
I am proud to be a UK citizen. 
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Affirmation Manipulation 
 
Self-affirmation condition 
In this first study we are interested in investigating personal achievements that people 
have experienced.  Please describe a personal achievement in your life (around 2-3 
sentences). Try to write about how this personal achievement makes you feel, and what 
this achievement reflects about you. 
 
Group-affirmation condition  
In this first study we are interested in investigating the UK’s achievements. Please 
describe an achievement of the UK (around 2-3 sentences). Try to write about how this 
achievement of the UK makes you feel as a UK citizen, and what this achievement 
reflects about the UK. 
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Climate Change Information 
 
There is a strong scientific consensus that the Earth is getting warmer, and that most of 
the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-twentieth century is 
due to the rise in greenhouse gases generated by human activity. The impact of this 
climate change will be felt most by the poorest people in the world – those who 
contribute little to nothing to the problem. Disruption in the climate system is already 
manifesting itself around the world through more frequent floods, droughts and heat 
waves. The severity of these consequences will increase if current greenhouse gas 
emissions are not reduced.  
 
The UK is a massive overproducer of the main greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide (CO2). It 
takes only 40 days for the UK to produce as much CO2 per person as most poor 
countries will in a year. Over 84 per cent of the world’s population live in countries 
which emit less CO2 per person than the UK. The UK was the first country which 
started contributing to climate change: In 1830, the UK began emitting more CO2 per 
year than the current sustainable level. The UK can move towards it’s sustainable goals 
if UK citizens are prepared to take simple steps to reduce their carbon emissions. 
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Definition Carbon Footprint 
 
In some of the following questions we will ask you about your carbon footprint. A 
carbon footprint is the sum of all emissions of CO2 (carbon dioxide), which are induced 
by your activities within a given time frame.  
 
A  low carbon footprint is an indication of an environmentally friendly lifestyle. 
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Outcome Measures 
 
Outgroup blame items  
Other western countries that contribute to climate change should modify their actions 
before the UK is required to reduce its carbon emissions. 
The UK does not need to reduce its carbon emissions if other western countries 
maintain their high levels of carbon emissions. 
Most other western countries are more to blame for climate change than is the UK. 
In comparison to other western countries, the UK has a very minimal impact on climate 
change.  
 
Rejection of consequences items 
The UK’s carbon emissions will only have a minor influence on weather-related 
disasters in poor countries. 
There is a strong relationship between weather-related disasters in poor countries and 
the UK’s carbon emissions (reversed scored).  
The harmful effects of the UK’s carbon emissions on poor countries are exaggerated. 
 
Moral judgment items 
It seems ethical to me to adjust one’s lifestyle in order to protect the earth. 
Trying to reduce your carbon footprint is the right thing to do. 
 
Group-efficacy items  
UK citizens can jointly reduce the negative consequences of climate change. 
Individuals in the UK can collectively reduce the negative consequences of climate 
change. 
UK citizens can together, through joint effort, achieve the goal of reducing the negative 
consequences of climate change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
